The first aim of the article is to present the lineage of party organizations integrating several "classical" approaches. Therefore a second aim is to set up a structural model able to catch the evolution of any typeof modern party organization. One assumes that Party Structure is an invariable element which subsumes several organizational translations. Same are protopartisan translations: leagues, armed and unarmed factions, parliamentary groups. Some are partisan translations: modern party organizations. This assumptions means a corollary: organizations tend to adapt to the kind of party competition they have to afford in order to have accessto governmental power. The model combines the assumptions in a two dimensional matrix. The first dimension is concerned with the organization's major historical goal. It takes three values: a) to elect of MP's; b) to promote a Weltanschauung; c) to elect the President. The second deals with mobilization and takes three values: adapted 1 ° to the age of «Registration Societies»; 2° the age of «One man, one vote system»; 3° the post McLuhan age of electronic media. The combination of the dimensions gives three lineages: Cadre Parties including Notability Parties, Voters Parties and Indirect Parties; Mass Parties including Activist Parties and Social Integration Parties; MachineParties.

Together with the emergence of strong executive presidencies and the frequency of coups d'Etat, the single party is one of the striking features of the political development in Africa South of the Sahara since 1960. More than half the countries of the continent are presently under one-party rule. This article attempts to analyse the origins, recent developments, and perspectives in the field of African single-party states. Sameelements favourable to the emergence of this phenomenon were the colonial heritage, the precolonial tradition, and the aura of legitimacy of the national liberation movements. Several techniques were usedby African leaders to impose rule by one party; distinction is made between political, legal and institutional, and authoritarian means. African leaders have relied on several justifications to rationalise the introduction of such regimes: economie development, national unity and nation-building, the absence of class-differentiation, the unanimitarian tradition, and the need to give constitutional recognition to a de facto situation. A critical analysis shows that these arguments do not, in general, withstand closer examination. The conclusion is that the single-party «ideology» serves mainly to protect the hegemony of a small and privileged political class of rulers against challenge of its position. As far as perspectives are concerned, three possibilities seem to be developing simultaneously: the Party-State, the no-party state, and the multi-party state. It is argued in a conclusion that the single-party state need not be undemocratic; some conditions for a democratic one-party system are set forth.

Although the popular referendum is part of Italy's 1948 constitution, the political parties in power delayed for more than 20 years putting it info practice. It was finally institutionalized in 1970 and has met on various occasions with caution or hostility from the political parties. Succeeding in mobilizing public opinion, shaking the political parties and speeding up the legislative process, the referendum disappointed in several respects. Especially the permanent conflict with parliament through the action of the radical party led to negativism on its behalf.

Although Belgian diplomats analysed the nazi-regime from the very first moment as intrinsically crimina!, inhuman, dictatorial and revenge seeking, they showed the nazis in 1934-1935 that dialogue was possible. The nazi-diplomacy, with secrecy as a keystone, permitted some of the most important Belgian politicians and businessmen to meet the nazi-leaders without being disapproved by public opinion or even parliament. This resulted in a «practical» way to improve political and above all economical relations between Belgium and nazi-Germany. It can be seen as a Belgian answer to the inability of France and Great Britain to force the Third Reich to respect the international security treaties which were to guarantee the sovereignty of Belgium.

Analysing the debate in the press concerning the most crucial and sensible point of Public Service Broadcasting in Belgium, i.e. an objective and nationwide representative news service, shows clearly that this critizing of the news has primarily a political function because its aim is not to demonstrate how subjectivc or so the news is supposed to be. Accepting and demonstrating the point that a public service organization of broadcasting is no worse for objective newsreporting than a commercial or a Dutch one; it follows from this that these critics must 'hide' other interests (namely pressure to political conformity and financial motives). Strong correlations are found between this press debate and the political debate on the nature of this system and the wish to change it. Thus the press, being part of the party system in Belgium, reveals itself as (literally) an agenda-setter of political action. These results do not suggest that the press bas an ultimate influence in political matters but it certainly demonstrates that the press indicates how the debate will develop. Showing up the agenda-setting concept in the dynamics of politics could be a more fruitfull way to define the political functions of the mass media.