The political agreements concluded in the summer of 1981 between the main majority and opposition parties (the centrist UCD and the socialist PSOE) constitute a turning point in the development of Spanish regionalism. Whereas previously autonomy statutes were awarded to historic regions with strong social and cultural identities, we have now a situation where a considerable degree of self-government is also made possible for all other regions. This decision shifted the focus more to socio-economic development, thereby stimulating expectations of improvement based on regional political efforts as well as on national solidarity and state assistance. The recently adopted statute of Andalucia illustrates excellently this new orientation. In this contribution an analysis is made of the institutional instruments available for regional self-government. The conclusions are quite positive with regard to the devolution of powers provided in the constitution and the different statutes. Nevertheless Spain is not evolving into a federal state system. As a more appropriate description we prefer Perez Moreno's characterisation of the existing intergovernmental relations as «autonomias integradas».

Rational public decision-making is nearly impossible for two reasons: the organisational complexity of public services and the existence of two circuits, a political one (parties, parliament...), and an administrativeone (bureaucracy). Moreover, public decisions are made by different pressure groups, and from different decision centres. In Belgium the impact of political parties is steadily increasing, up to the point where they function as master-organisations that have set up their own institutions to carry out public tasks (e.g. education). In thesocio-economie field the government acts more often as an arbitrator and money-supplier than as a decision-maker. In the welfare state the government's position in the whole field of decision-making amounts to delegating decisions to private organisations and pressure groups, which in due course leads to corporatism andirrationality. Finally, the organisation structure of the civil service itself stimulates irrationality because it was set up as a pyramid hierarchy in a time when the government did not have many tasks.

The institutional model as delineated by classical Public Administration has limited utility for public administration in the developing countries. There are unlikely to be any uniform structural remedies foradministrative defects in those countries. Similar relationships do not have similar consequences in different contexts. An increased awareness along these lines led to the emergence of Development Administration- an effort to relate structures to goals - and Comparative Public Administration - analysis of administrative structures in their own societal contexts. The basic argument of the present articles is that despite our increased sophistication on these matters the relevance in Development Administration cannot be obtained if one relies only on theoretical knowledge. It is noted that in Development Administration thinking must descend from the heights of systematic theory to the open country of praxis.

Previous research has shown that there is a strong relationship between church involvement and preference for the Belgian Christian Democratic Party (CVP/PSC). When religious preference is controled, the relationship between social class and preference for the CVP/PSC seems to disappear completely. Indeed, this party is very heterogeneous as regards the social origins of its adherents. The situation is completely different for preference for the Socialist Party (BSP/PSB) which has a strong relationship between party preference, on the one hand, church involvement and social class, on the other. The unchurched and the workers manifest more preference for the BSP/PSB than do other people. According to Hill the degree of involvement in the «zuil» (pillar organizations), the so-called «organizational variable», is also significant in the explanation of voting behavior. This could not be confirmed, however, due to a lack of data. Two hypotheses are formulated: 1) pillar involvement in addition to social class and church involvement is significant in the preference for the BSP; 2) there is no connection between preference for the CVP and social class so that only church and pillar involvement remain. These two models were tested by means of loglinear analysis and seem to fit the data. The intention of this article, however, is primarily didactic: to show the possibilities and limitations of the analysis of contingency tables by means of Goodmans loglinear analysis procedure through the use of asimple and relevant example.