Studying the Belgian military and foreign policy from 1934 till 1937, one can conclude to the following working hypotheses. The conflict between the King (and His entourage) and the Cabinet about the competency over military policy and military command has had a large influence on the acute phase of the Question Royale 1940-1950. The policy of independence of 1936 which has been imputed later on to the King and for which He has been blamed, is rather contained in the military and foreign policy of the successive Belgian governments from 1930 on, inspired by Paul Hymans, minister of foreign affairs at that time.

During the campaign of may 1940 and the following month, King Leopold III had as principal political counsellor Henri De Man. He played a primordial role during that period, which was rich with extremely important events for the future of Belgium, such as the surrender of the army and the problem of the King reassuming or not his constitutionalprerogative during the occupation. The former socialist minister did not accidentally hold the situation of confident of the King. Indeed, both men became friends before the war. They shared similar conceptions about interior and foreign policyproblems. In fact, Leopold III supported De Man in his attempt, during the winter 1938-1939, to convoke a peace conference. On the other end early 1939 they both expressed rather similar conceptions on the functioning of the Belgian institutions and especially on the lack of authority of the executive power. The projects of manifestoes by De Man concerning the political future of Belgium were grounded on a reinforcement of the executive power. So the manifesto of june 1940, a consequence of De Man's contacts with the King, reveals the role which the King should or could have assumed if Hitler had permitted it.

The leopoldistic version of the events before Berchtesgaden - politically the most important period in the Question Royale during the occupation - is from the start till the end historically not grounded. The known facts prove that the King was absolutely not passive in political matters. He doesn't reject the proposal for a meeting with Hitler. Already on May 31 he declares to agree in principle to meet the Führer. On June 26 he again expresses this willingness. In October he sends his sister Marie-José, crownprincess of Italy, to Hitler, collecting the requested invitation for a meeting. The meeting Hitler-Leopold III at Berchtesgaden (November 19) reveals not only a humanitarian, but also an indeniable political character. There is too great a difference between the leopoldistic version and the facts - as far as known at this moment and from limited sources. One is inclined to ask oneself if the editors of the Whitebook (J. Pirenne, secretary of the King) and of the report of the Servais-commission, had knowledge of all the facts, which normally should have been at their disposal. If the answer is no, than one has to assume «a secret of the King».

This present study tries to encircle the image of King Leopold III as it was fashioned by public opinion during the occupation. It excludes the collaborationist movements and the exiled Belgians in London. Different sources have been interrogated: reports on public opinion destinated to the Cabinet-in-exile in London, available diaries and most of all underground leafl,ets and newspapers. The public opinion underwent a strong evolution from 1940 till 1944 and changed according to social classes. The author particularly describes some significant moments: the surrender of the army, the King's marriage, the forced labour. After a highly pronounced admiration during 1940, a very clear turn is already palpable at the end of 1941. This reverse is due to regained confidence in democracy. It translates the refusalof dictatorial projects formulated in certain circles, intending to invest the King with absolute power in a corporative society, which should be rid of parliament and political parties. The image of the Royal prisoner of war received a decisive blow by his marriage. This deconsacration was reinforced by the germanophile sentiments, imputed to His court,and by the royal silence kept about some methods of the occupational power. The Church however proved to be a resolute defender of the King. On the other hand, Flanders and Wallonia react differently. At Liège, the hostility even spreads among some christian-democratic circles. Gradually the Royal Question, which has agitated the opinion from 1940-1942, fades away, and the deportation of Leopold III took place in a climate of indifference. However, not a single authorized voice of the underground movement demands the retirement of the King at the moment of the liberation. For all groups and parties it remains an open question, their only wish being to obtain explanations. Thus, the Royal Question, based on the positions adopted during the occupation, can only be explained by the circumstances which happened after the war.

The period 1944-1950 witnessed the successful reconstruction of the Belgian Socialist Party. Despite some modifications of structure and leadership personnel, the party retained many of its pre-war characteristics. There was no significant modernization of doctrine. In particular, its role as a party of government was accentuated. The PSB played amajor role in increasing social welfare programs and restoring the Belgian economy, but made few structural reforms. Despite opposition to a division of the world into blocs, it was eventually forced into the American camp. The PSB's main political accomplishment was preventing the return to the throne of Leopold. By the end of this period, the PSB had largely become a party of the status quo.

The present investigation looks at the recent success of ethnolinguistic politics as, largerly, the outcome of friction betweèn the existing -pattern of political integration and a set of relatively new · socio-economic conditions. The development of the latter is part of what may be implied in the phrase «post-industrial society». The Belgian pattern of political integration is characterized by very low levels of differentiation between the parties, the administration and the voluntary organizations. It implies a mode of political participation in which the recent developments in the organization of labor, expansion of the tertiary sector, geographical mobility and urbanization lead to political marginality for the groupsconcerned. This marginality expresses itself in support for ethnolinguism which serves as an alternative route to political integration. This theory is evaluated and substantiated on the basis of an ecological analysis of the success of an ethnolinguistic party (the Front Démocratique des Francophones) in the 1970 and 1976 communal elections.