Is the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Union in its judgment of 27 April 2017, A-Rosa Flussschiff, C-620/15, of Article 14(2)(a) of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71, as amended and updated by Regulation (EC) No 118/97, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 647/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 April 2005, applicable to a dispute relating to the offence of concealed employment in which E 101 certificates were issued under Article 14(1)(a), pursuant to Article 11(1) of Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 of 21 March 1972 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation No 1408/71, although the situation was covered by Article 14(2)(a)(i), for workers carrying on their activity in the territory of the Member State of which they are nationals and in which the air transport undertaking established in another Member State has a branch, and a mere reading of the E 101 certificate, which refers to an airport as the place where the worker is employed and an air transport undertaking as employer, suggested that that certificate had been obtained fraudulently?

In the affirmative, must the principle of the primacy of EU law be interpreted as precluding a national court, bound under its domestic law by the principle that the force of res judicata of a judgment of a criminal court is binding on a civil court, from drawing the appropriate conclusions from a decision of a criminal court which is not compatible with the rules of EU law by ordering, in civil proceedings, an employer to pay damages to a worker solely because of the criminal conviction of that employer for concealed employment?