European states, including Belgium, have looked at the construction of Europe through an economie and a political prism. Both dimensions have evolved following parallel paths. In Belgium a large consensus has always existed concerning the economie dimension of the European construction. In this respect Belgiums post-1945 European policies area direct continuation of the interwar efforts to build a West-European economic area, based on a free trade philosophy and a rejection of economic nationalism which always handicapped small trading states such as Belgium. Even before the second world war the Belgian elite thus accepted the principles of economic multilateralism. In the political dimension however a consensus on a federal Europe only emerged at the end of the seventies. Till then, important parts of the Belgian political elite remained sceptical and even hostile to the construction of a supranational Europe, based on a traditional view on political autonomy and independence. The reasons why Belgian views on the political dimension of Europe slowly shifted to a federal objective were partly domestic and partly the result of the growing awareness that a small countries' political interests in the world can be best pursued through supranationality.

The 1969-72 period has shown an evolution in the belgian european policy. White instituional orthodoxy and federalist teleology had prevailed in the sixties, some pragmatism has been added since Prime minister Gaston Eyskens met President Pompidou in Paris in june 1972. Belgium accepts the launching of a cooperation among the national foreign policies outside the sphere of the EC institutions; regular summits of heads of government are also agreed on. Pragmatism doesn't weaken however the belgian concerns about orthodoxy. Belgian diplomacy is claiming a twofold orthodoxy. The "de lege fata" one insists on the compliance of the institutional practises with the legal provisions of the Treaties and on the extension of the scope of the EC policies by using the faculty provided by art. 235 EC. The constant refusal of the so called "compromis de Luxembourg" and the recurrent plea for the qualified majority voting, or the emphasis put on the powers of the Commission illustrate this kind of orthodoxy. The "de lege ferenda" orthodoxy consists of preventing institutional evolutions from closing the road to the long term federalist aims belgian diplomacy is still working towards for European integration. Hence some dilemmas between pragmatism on short term issues and some dogmatic rigidities which refer to the federalist finality. The discussion about twofold orthodoxy is grounded on a belgian positions' analysis on european affairs which covers the period from the end of the sixties to the belgian positions at the 1996 IGC. By the future perspective of a broader EU enlargement, Belgium will also face a new challenge: will its relative political weight be decreasing in the same time theUnion will extend? Which will be the price for accepting less Belgium in a larger Union?

The way Belgium implements European Law, meaning how it transposes EU directives into national law, is heavily influenced by its federal structure. The fact that 7 governments and parliaments may all have to intervene in a transposition of a directive for which the competences are divided between them and the fact that a number of consultative procedures have to be respected (the legal scrutiny by the State Council and the advices to be given by committees consisting of trade and other professional unions) explain why Belgium has been lagging behind in transposing EU directives within their time limit. In Belgium the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in charge of coordinating the transposition of EU directives and representing Belgium in procedures at the European Court of Justice.

The Belgian civil servants who are involved in the working groups of the European Council of Ministers on a full-time basis are a small elite corps which is hardly typical for the Belgian civil service as a whole. Most of its members belong to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or to other ministries as these have delegates in the Permanent Representation. Their responsibilities too are rather different from those of the normal Belgian civil servant. The latter are typically engaged in the implementation of the policies designed by their political masters, the farmer are largely autonomous policy makers and negotiators, though mostly in matters of minor political importance. In one regard though, these Euro-Belgians are still recognizable as typically Belgian. Their political culture is characterized, tough to a lesser degree than that of the other senior civil servants in Belgium, by a technocratism which is very distrustful of political actors and by a remarkable level of distrust of their organisational infrastructure. Such a culture should lead to a poor performance in the working groups of the Council of Ministers. But it does not. That is the paradox this contribution intends to examine.

This article examines the organisation and strategies of Belgian interest groups and their European peak-organisations with respect to the EU policy-making arena. It conceptualises the European Union as a of multi-level governance political system that consists ofmultiple interlocking government levels (sub-national, national and supranational), governed by means of non-hierarchical actor configurations with a blurred boundary between the public and the private sphere. It further argues that the European policy-making can best be studied from a (historical) new-institutionalist perspective which emphasises that the preferences andthe behaviour of political actors are shaped by the institutional context which provides opportunities and constraints. Evidence of the institutionalfactors within a multi-level governance setting is then given from the organisational structure and strategies of Belgian interest groups in general and from the environmental policy sector in particular.

Belgium is generally perceived as being one of the most fervent supporters of European integration. It is supposed that this is equally true for both, the Belgian political elite and the Belgian population. Unlike in other EU member states, no large public discussion on EU integration has taken place. Therefore, it is generally supposed that Lindberg's concept of the permissive consensus applies to the Belgians. This article aims, first, at challenging empirically the existence ofa permissive consensus in Belgium. In 1997 both qualitative and quantitative data on the policy position on EU issues ofabout 130 Belgian social organisations have been collected. Content analysis ofthese positions shows that the existence ofa permissive consensus seems to be dependent on a number of variables (institutional or policy issues, policy domain, types of actors involved...) and that a general observation of a permissive consensus has to be relaxed. Second, if permissive consensus is declining, why is it, then, that no open political controversy on European integration has emerged? In answering this, thefocus is on two explanatory variables: the resources of those that would liketo mobilise are quite limited and their opinion on European politics is rather heterogeneous and undeveloped.