Si l'année 1980 avec quatre gouvernements et tout autant de formules gouvernementales ne fut pas un exemple de stabilité mais plutot d'instabilité politique, l'année 1981 ne peut pas davantage être considérée comme une année politiquement stable. Au cours de l'année passée trois gouvernements se sont succédés; de ce fait, en l'espace de deux ans, la Belgique a connu au total sept gouvernements. (L'instabilité au niveau gouvernemental peut être expliqué en grande partie par la polarisation plus forte autour des oppositions économiques et par l'adaptation pénible des partis traditonnels aux structures de l'Etat belge régionalisé. La polarisation grandissante autour de la scission économique se manifesta lors de la préparation et l'élaboration des plans extrêmement nombreux mis au point par les gouvernements socio-chrétiens-socialistes Martens IV et Eyskens I, ces plans ayant pour but de s'attaquer aux problèmes économiques et budgétaires (plan de relance, mini-plan de relance, plan gouvernemental d'assainissement budgétaire, plan de sauvetage économique, programme d'urgence, loi de programme). Cependant tous ces plans ne contiennent pas de mesures sociales, économiques et financières fondamentales. De telles mesures ont toutefois été annoncées par le gouvernement socio-chrétien-libéral Martens V, qui vit le jour après les élections du 8 novembre - élections remarquables par ailleurs. Ces élections introduisirent également une nouvelle phase dans la réforme d'Etat. L'innovation la plus importante en cette occurrence fut le fait que les trois exécutifs régionaux et communautaires - le Conseil Flamand, le Conseil de la Communauté Française et le Conseil Régional Wallon - ne sont plus nommés par le Roi mais élus au sein des conseils. En outre, les ministres des communautés et des régions (excepté ceux de l'exécutif bruxellois) ne font plus partie du gouvernement national.

It is striking to note that the political unrest and instability in 1981 coincided with continual and serious unrest on the national money market. On the political party level, one notes that the Christian Democratic Parties and the Socialist Parties had more and more difficulties in getting along with each other. This probably is related to the policyof the new chairman of the French-speaking Socialist Party, who has resolutely chosen to back Wallonia. The Flemish Christian Democratic Party, has still difficulties in seeing itself as the largest party in Flanders and to act appropriately. In addition, the French-speaking Socialist Party feels confident in the conviction that influential circles, including the Court, prefer not to see the Socialists in the opposition. This has motivated some to cling as long as possible to the formation of a three -party cabinet. The actual political situation, however, has clearly demonstrated that such a three-party cabinet cannot fu nction for a long time. The question remains why the Christian Democratic Party has not pursued elections with the same energy as it did in September af ter the resignationof the Martens IV government. In the meantime, it has become evident that the state reform of August 1980 is certainly not «completed», that is should best be redone, andthat the consequences of this reorganization can be gauged only with difficulty.

Between 1919 and 1981, Belgium was confronted with a number of profound societal crises: one world war, two af termaths of world wars, severe economie crises, a new political orientation, and serious internal political conflicts. This article examines the reaction of the elite to these crises, and operationalizes this reaction by the circulationof the elite. The non-political elite remained strikingly stable in spite of the multiplicity and intensity of the crises. The political elite, in this period, circulated much more rapidly. Still, this was primarily in function of governmental instability. Crises shrink the room for maneuver of politicians, but crises are clearly not the only, and even not the most important factors contributing to governmental instability. The changes were, moreover, compensated for to a considerable degree by returns to former positions. Thus, there was a lot of rotation rather than circulation, especially among the top-level politicians.

The nuclear energy decision-making process is a clear example of the difficulty the Belgian political system has in making decisions. An explanation for this incapability has to be sought among the political elite, which allows the Belgian economy to be directed by special interests. This admission fits into an «elitist consensus», an unwritten agreement among top-political leaders. Threats to this elitist consensus are subtly neutralized, leaving the power of these economie groups unaffected. The power of the private producers of electricity is to a large extent consolidated by the inertia of the political system. This passivity is instrumental in maintaining the elitist consensus. The power of the anti-nuclear groups, measured in its mobilizing effects, is relatively small. As producers of energy, the electricity companies have a privileged position in the Belgian economic system, because energy is thought to be the motor of economic growth. A thorough parliamentary debate on energy could change the elitist consensus but for this, a political majority would have to be found.