

# Populism as a Visual Communication Style

## An Exploratory Study of Populist Image Usage of Flemish Block/Interest in Belgium (1991-2018)

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### Abstract

*This article analyses the visual communication of the Flemish populist right-wing party Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang, and investigates whether or not the party uses a specific populist communication style in its campaign posters, whether or not its visual style evolves over time and how the party distinguishes itself from other (right-wing) parties in its use of images. To do this, the image use will be compared with the CVP/CD&V and the Volksunie/N-VA. This use of images will be investigated by analysing election posters from 1991 to 2018. The analysis shows that there is indeed a 'populist visual style'. These items consist mainly of (negative) metaphors, false dilemmas, caricatures and the use of so-called 'agonic' visual techniques.*

**Keywords:** Populism, image use, visual style, campaign, posters, visual, Flanders, populist right, Belgium.

### 1 Introduction

The study of right-wing populism has gained momentum. Much more is written about the populist right than about any other party family. Previous studies have paid considerable attention to explanations for the electoral success or failure of populist parties (Mudde, 2013; Rooduijn, de Lange, & van der Brug, 2014), their ideological programmes (Bale, 2012; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007) and the parties' impact on politics and policy (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013; Rooduijn et al., 2014).

Recently, populism as a communication style has received much attention. Studies focus, first and foremost, on the discourse of right-wing populist parties (De Cleen, 2017; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Sheets, Bos, & Boomgaarden, 2016). However, communication is more than words alone; images are also an integral part of political communication and can have substantial impact as well: 'one image is worth a thousand words'. Indeed, right-wing populist parties increasingly rely on so-called 'coded' non-verbal communication, which 'disguises' dis-

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criminatory messages using certain techniques, such as irony, to deflect racist accusations (Doerr, 2017a; Wodak, 2015).

Apart from some studies conducted by Ruth Wodak (2015) and other research concerning populist visual use online (Doerr, 2017b; Gimenez & Schwarz, 2016), there is a gap in the specific analysis of populist visuals, or 'image use'. This article contributes to this emerging field by examining the populist image use of Vlaams Blok/Belang (Flemish Block/Interest) in Belgium (Flanders), and comparing this to mainstream parties' communication.

Apart from the fact that it examines populism as a visual style, the study has relevance also because populism is on the rise in Western Europe and because an investigation concerning posters and populism (and the analysis on a micro level) has not really been done yet. Posters are still considered to be one of the most influential means of campaigning (Vandeleene, De Winter, & Baudewyns, 2018). They are also one of the only means of campaigning that has been used over a long period, allowing for a longitudinal analysis to be conducted (Vliegthart, 2012).

A previous study conducted by Jagers and Walgrave (2007) was one of the first to conceptualize and analyse populism as a communication style. Their analysis of electoral advertisements on television showed that the Vlaams Blok was by far the most against the state and the media in its rhetoric. Its discourse also differed significantly from that of other parties, in that it actively called for the exclusion of certain population groups in society. Building on this study, this article investigates whether or not Vlaams Blok/Belang also uses a specific *visual* populist communication style in its campaign posters. Can we identify a specific populist image usage that includes lots of antagonism, anti-elitism, reverence of 'the pure, hard-working people' and anti-immigrant sentiment?

To investigate this, a content analysis of 124 posters was conducted, tracking several elements of the posters, which amounted to the slogans and the visuals. Posters from three parties were coded, namely Vlaams Blok/Belang, CVP/CD&V (Christian Democrats) and Volksunie/N-VA (Flemish nationalists) over a period of 27 years (from 1991 to 2018).

Note that this research has its limitations: some parties had noticeably less posters to analyse, which has led to some skewed statistics. This was mainly the case with older, earlier 1990s' posters that were published before the internet became commonplace. Another factor that should be considered is that no posters of Vlaams Blok/Belang were included from the period 2000-2010. No usable posters have found from this transitional decade.

In what follows, populism will be analysed as a political communication style, followed by the case of Vlaams Blok/Belang. Then the methodology will be discussed with the analysis and findings, and, finally, the conclusion and discussion will round up this work.

## 2 Populism as a Political Communication Style

Although populism has been classified under many concepts, i.e. as a discourse, a movement and so on, we will look at the two most relevant strands for the sake of this research: populism as an ideology and as a communication style. The former is used to define what is understood as populism in this research, the latter on how exactly to operationalize it when applied to communicative content.

In order to establish a 'baseline' on what populism exactly is, we will use the conceptualization of Cas Mudde (2004). He defines populism as

an ideology that considers society to be divided into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people. (Mudde, 2004, p. 543)

In Mudde's understanding, populists divide society into two homogeneous groups, the elite versus 'the people' (Mudde, 2004, 2013). Society is divided into two camps, more specifically, the 'good, pure people' versus the 'corrupt elite'. The only 'correct' form of politics would therefore be in the name of the people, thus for the majority, and not in favour of a small elite (Eatwell & Mudde, 2003; Kopecký & Mudde, 2000; Mudde, 2013).

This definition of Mudde is formed by the 'less is more' principle, using the lowest common denominator. Mudde's definition is helpful for this research, because it is concise, 'straight to the point' and yet retains the essence of what populism is. Moreover, Mudde's definition remains essential to many contemporary studies of populism. In order to properly operationalize these points made by Mudde, we will look at the other strand of research: populism as a communication style. For the purpose of this research, we will be examining four key elements of populism that are included in Mudde's definition: distinguishing two key groups in society (people and elites), speaking for 'the people', anti-elitism and the exclusion of 'others'.

*First*, from Mudde's definition populism distinguishes two antagonist groups in society: the elite and the 'pure' people. Indeed, earlier studies that examined this element in populist communication corroborated this expectation. Jagers and Walgrave (2007) found that populist communication referred more to these two groups in their communication. In addition to references to people, populist communication presented a higher degree of 'anti-establishment' profiling in their discourse compared with other parties in Belgium (Flanders). Moreover, in Italy and Germany the populist right also tended to use words that (in)directly refer to the people and elites as well, for example 'us', 'we', 'elite', 'politicians' and so on. As such, studies indicate that these two groups feature prominently in populist communication (Caiani & Della Porta, 2011).

With regard to the *second* element (speaking for 'the people'), the study by Jagers and Walgrave (2007) demonstrated that Vlaams Blok (Flemish Block) made more references to 'the people'. People-centric communication was also found in the study by Caiani and Della Porta (2011), who examined the communi-

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cation not only of populist right parties but also of far-right populist social movements (e.g. skinhead groups) in both Italy and Germany. Moreover, the language that populists use is often uncomplicated, easily understood and direct, because through this style of communication they show that they are close to their intended electorate and do not campaign up high from their proverbial 'ivory tower' (Engesser, Fawzi, & Larsson, 2017; Stanley, 2008). As such, speaking for the people is expected to be more pronounced in populist communication.

*Third*, the exclusion of out-groups is a mainstay element of populism. Populism on its own does not have an anti-immigration angle (De Cleen, 2017; Otjes & Louwse, 2015). However, when combining populism with right-wing nationalist rhetoric (or right-wing populism), the ethnic and cultural factors do significantly matter. Their anti-immigration angle is derived from the nativist and ultranationalist component, not the populist component (De Cleen, 2017). The anti-immigration factor is the most prominently visible in right-wing populist rhetoric (Wodak, 2015). Thus, it is important for this study to include this factor as well.

*Fourth*, populist communication is also decidedly anti-elitist. Although these elites are usually political elites, they can also constitute media elites, intellectuals, the state or supranational entities (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Anti-elitist rhetoric was found in Belgium, Germany and Italy and is considered to be an integral part of populist communication (Caiani & Della Porta, 2011; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007).

To investigate the visual communication of Vlaams Blok/Belang, we will examine the four elements of populism outlined above in their campaign posters. The analytical part of this study therefore focuses on a comparison between the populist party Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang and the mainstream (CVP/CD&V and Volksunie/N-VA, right-wing non-populist parties).

Consistent with their worldview, the 'pure, hard-working' people are being threatened by 'dangerous others' (Matthes & Schmuck, 2017). This 'threat' appeal is one of the core beliefs of populism. Populism divides society into those that 'threaten' and those that 'are being threatened'. Therefore, the first hypothesis (H1) is: *Populist party (Vlaams Blok/Belang) posters divide society into two segments (the righteous people versus the 'insidious others') that are at odds with each other more often than non-populist party posters.*

Many populist parties do not call themselves 'parties', but 'movements', 'alliances', 'fronts' or 'blocs' to accentuate this. This implies that they represent large parts of the population, further cementing the perception of them having a deep bond with 'the people'. The party name is a powerful concept that works via association, as an important means of attracting voters. Therefore, they tend to use words in their name that have links to their core ideological concepts (Jungar & Jupskās, 2014). In short, the party name suggests a deep connection with the public. This leads to the second hypothesis (H2): *Populist (Vlaams Blok/Belang) posters refer to the 'pure, hard-working' people more often than non-populist party posters.*

One of the most prominent features of right-wing populist parties is their anti-immigration stance. Immigrants are by far the most common out-group targeted by the populist right. Arguments against this out-group range from the

socio-economic sphere (welfare chauvinism) to the cultural sphere (fear of total Islamization) (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014; Oesch, 2008).

This leads to the third (H3) hypothesis: *Populist (Vlaams Blok/Belang) posters shift the blame more often onto out-groups (such as immigrants) than do non-populist party posters.*

Populist parties differentiate themselves by presenting themselves as being the ones that are 'untainted' by the 'establishment'. Thereby, they hope to garner the popular vote by virtue of their outsider image (McDonnell & Newell, 2011). Elites (the judiciary system, the government, journalists, etc.) are considered corrupt and only self-serving to the detriment of 'the common folk' (Mudde, 2004). One popular school of thought is that crises strengthen populists. Voting for populist parties (that are often fiercely anti-establishment) is a way to punish those in charge. Populists almost always call those in charge 'the elite' or 'the establishment' and declare that they have to be brought to their knees. The solution these populist parties often propose for 'fixing' society is simple and therefore easy to explain to voters, making it more appealing to them (Moffitt, 2016). Furthermore, austerity measures that have been in place since 2008 across Europe are a notable factor (Alvares & Dahlgren, 2016). In the aftermath of the banking crisis of 2008, many governments responded with austerity measures aimed at halting the economic decline. As a result, socio-economic inequality across Europe grew. Populist parties emerged and gained influence as they vowed to 'protect' the people against the 'evil' bankers and politicians ('the establishment'), who let this crisis happen (Vittori, 2016).

Thus, the fourth (H4) hypothesis is *Populist (Vlaams Blok/Belang) posters tend to take a stronger anti-establishment stance than non-populist party posters.*

### 3 Case: Vlaams Blok/Belang in Belgium (Flanders)

The Flemish right-wing party Vlaams Blok/Belang was chosen because within Belgium it was considered one of the only relevant parties on the populist right, next to the French Front National. Vlaams Blok was in many ways modelled after this particular party (Mudde, 2007). Moreover, it is considered a typical example of a populist right-wing party (Pauwels, 2014).

The party itself was founded in 1978 by two dissident factions of the Volksunie (of which the N-VA is now the successor). The party's rhetoric consists of a blend of Flemish ultranationalism, mixed with anti-Belgian sentiment and a certain amount of xenophobia (Coffé, Heyndels, & Vermeir, 2007; Mudde, 2002). Despite (and because of) this, its success kept growing from the early 1990s onwards. During the so-called 'Black Sunday' elections in 1991, the party was able to obtain 12 seats in the Belgian Chamber of Representatives. The party continued to grow over the next decade, despite the cordon sanitaire, gaining 18% of the votes cast in 2003 (Coffé, 2005a; Coffé & Tirions, 2004). In 2004, during the regional elections, more than one out of five Flemings voted for Vlaams Blok (Moufahim, Reedy, & Humphreys, 2015).

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As a populist party, Vlaams Blok/Belang projects itself as the ultimate defender and representative of ‘the common people’. The populist party claims to be part of the people and to speak in their name. An example of this is Vlaams Blok’s old slogan ‘Wij zeggen wat u denkt’ (We say what you think).

Nevertheless, Vlaams Blok became so controversial that it got sued for racism in 2004 and had to change its name from Vlaams Blok to Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest). Building on the aforementioned nativism, right-wing populist parties usually combine nativism with extreme nationalism and welfare chauvinism, which results in a xenophobic rhetoric that blames non-natives for most of the ills of society (Mudde, 2002). This also goes hand in hand with a call for more repressive measures concerning crime and a stricter law-and-order approach overall (Mudde, 2002, 2004). Since the change from Vlaams Blok to Vlaams Belang, the party seems to have taken a different course. Whereas the Vlaams Blok discourse was very confrontational, sharp and hostile, Vlaams Belang appears to have a somewhat milder tone (Coffé, 2005b). Rassemblement National (the now former Front National) in France vowed to de-demonize the image of its party (Mudde, 2016). With the arrival of a new chairman, Tom Van Grieken, the party also appears to follow their example. The party rebranded itself as a mainstream alternative party for a white working-class/lower middle class (Moufahim et al., 2015). In 2004, however, the party began to steadily decline, while the Flemish nationalist N-VA started growing and many former Vlaams Belang constituents began voting for the N-VA. This had the effect of almost halving Vlaams Belang’s electoral support in 2010, compared with 2004. It decreased from 24.2% in 2004 to 15.3% in 2010 on the federal level (Pauwels, 2011).

Their language might seem to have softened a bit, although their ultimate goals and motivations have not. One of their most prominent goals is still the creation of an independent Flanders (Moufahim et al., 2015). Vlaams Belang is also still unable to govern owing to the ‘cordon sanitaire’. Despite this cordon, they were still able to thrive and cash in on their ‘outsider’ image (Mudde, 2007).

#### 4 Methodology

In order to test the hypotheses, election campaign posters of Flemish parties were coded in a systematic comparative manner, using visual content analysis. This tool analyses the overarching components of populism (exclusion of ‘others’, ‘the people’, ‘the elite’ and general antagonism), as mentioned by Jagers and Walgrave (2007).

Posters are one of the most reliable ‘old’ forms of direct communication between parties and their voters (Dumitrescu, 2010; Matthes & Schmuck, 2017; Walter & Vliegenthart, 2010). In addition, posters are a good way for parties to provoke a quick reaction among voters, as they can persuade them by appealing to their most primitive and basic emotions, fear and excitement or enthusiasm (Brader, 2005).

Because Belgium does not have a central database of all electoral posters of all parties, data had to be triangulated. In a first stage, campaign posters were



<b>Party</b>	<b>1990s-2000s</b>	<b>2000s-2010s</b>	<b>2010s-2018</b>
Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang	17	–	20
CVP/CD&V	29	18	7
Volksunie/N-VA	11	11	11

requested from the parties themselves. This proved to be insufficient, because most parties only keep a very limited archive that is not always accessible to everyone. In a second phase, central archives were consulted in person. Physical posters from the 1990s that were never uploaded onto the Web were found here. They were from an era in which the internet was not yet widespread. The posters of Vlaams Blok/Belang and Volksunie/N-VA were found at the ADVN (Archive, Documentation and Research Center for Flemish Nationalism), the posters of the CVP/CD&V at the KADOC (KULeuven Documentation and Research Center for Religion, Culture and Society). Unfortunately, even the collections in the archives were sometimes incomplete. Precise dates were not always available and in some cases had to be deduced from the context and content of the poster (i.e. the candidates featured, specific issues that were raised during that period, particular events depicted, etc.). In a third stage, additional election posters were looked up online. These posters were found through regular search engines (e.g. Google, Bing, etc.). Most of these posters were found by searching for keywords such as 'poster', 'campaign', 'election' combined with the name of the party. This strategy yielded, for the most part, more recent electoral posters.

Only campaign posters from political parties were analysed. Other posters, such as political awareness-raising campaign posters, which were only tangentially related to a party, were not included in the data set. Vague posters for which no concrete year could be obtained were barred. Note that nowadays, thanks to social media and the internet, political parties have resorted to being in 'permanent campaign' mode (Larsson, 2016). This means that some posters are still considered as being campaign posters, even if they were published during non-election years. This is especially the case with the more recent posters. In total, 124 posters were analysed.

The comparative aspect was approached in two ways: over time and between parties. The analysis over time starts in 1991, as this constituted the breakthrough (Black Sunday) of Vlaams Blok in Belgium (Flanders). The end date of the study is 2018.

For the comparison between the parties, Vlaams Blok/Belang was compared with CVP/CD&V and N-VA/Volksunie. The choice for the Christian Democratic CVP/CD&V is determined by the fact that this is a traditional centre-right government party. The Flemish nationalist N-VA/Volksunie is an interesting case because both Vlaams Blok/Belang and Volksunie/N-VA have claims on the same Flemish nationalist heritage (Breuning, 1997). Furthermore, because of the 'cordon sanitaire', many Flemish nationalists have opted to vote for the more moder-

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ate N-VA as this party is not excluded from government participation through the ‘cordon sanitaire’ (Pauwels, 2011).

#### 4.1 Coding of Posters

The campaign posters were coded and analysed through visual content analysis, following the method of Rose (2007). She distinguishes three characteristics that each poster carries: the technology that made the poster possible, the social aspect and the composition. Only the social aspect and the composition will be examined as these are the most meaningful elements. Composition refers to what is seen explicitly on the poster, while the social aspect is about the meaning and connotation the composition carries.

Two elements of each election poster were coded: the text (the slogans) and the images (photographs, cartoons, people, etc.). Each is coded separately in the coding table (Annex I). The first element includes textual elements, which is the main slogan of the poster. Slogans are of great importance as they try to evoke an impression or emotional response (Denton Jr., 1980).

The second element, also dubbed ‘scene’, focused solely on the *visual* elements. Scenes are the situations depicted on the poster. These scenes can be negative (to be avoided) or positive (something to aspire to). Voting on the political party in question supposedly will avoid the negative situation from happening in reality and let the positive situation become reality. Dividing lines, (negative) stereotypes, dangerous out-groups and the images of the ‘pure, hard-working people’, among others, were analysed. In other words, only the images were analysed, not the words.

Certain elements were explicitly ignored: the names/logos of the party were skipped in the coding if those elements did not contribute to the overall message of the poster. Otherwise, some posters would get a massive but unjustifiable score inflation (in particular the parties with ‘Volk’ in their name). Likewise, pictures of politicians in scenes were disregarded with respect to references to people. Although politicians may try to appeal to the people, in the case of this research ‘pure, righteous people’ were synonymous with ‘regular anonymous persons’ or ‘the nameless everyman’ that everyone can relate to.

Finally, some posters did not contain a ‘scene’ but only electoral candidates. All of these posters generally contained a picture of the candidate in question, their name and a (short) slogan. The slogan was the only element analysed in those cases, as there was no other meaningful data to investigate visually. Most of the candidates had a neutral stance, neutral expression, against a blank background and wore standard suits or business clothing. Contrary to the case in certain other countries, such as Austria or France, no real attempts were made in Flanders to wear ‘traditional’ clothing (to suggest a deep bond with the region) or ‘casual’ clothing, in order to woo the ‘regular people’.

The coding book and questions accompanying the ‘basic table’ contain the four main indicators of populism, as described above. In other words, the slogan and visuals will be ‘examined’ for any of the four populist indicators. Multiple questions are linked to one indicator.



The first indicator investigates whether or not the party sees society divided into two groups: 'the pure people' versus the 'insidious others'. This means looking at exclusionary rhetoric and 'us versus them' logic. It also helped to include populist posters with visual dividing lines (and colours) separating 'the native folk' from 'the dangerous immigrants'. This component also serves to classify the several ways of picturing 'others'. Stereotypes or caricatures are good examples.

The second indicator looks at how 'the pure, hard-working people' are referred to. Slogans that refer to 'the people' directly by name, by nationality or even profession are all counted among 'the pure people'. When it comes to visuals, scenes with idyllic settings, featuring the 'average Joe', are often made to appeal to the 'pure, righteous people'. On the flip side, posters in which the depicted 'everyday people' are threatened or are under attack by a host of factors (government, society, immigrants, etc.) are also made to appeal to 'the people', but with fear as the main motivator.

The third indicator looks at the out-groups in more detail. Whereas it used to be mostly ideological opponents (which are still included in the coding table), nowadays populist parties have pushed the narrative towards the cultural arena with identity politics (Todd, 2018). While most of the 'out-groups' envisioned by populist parties are expected to be Muslims or immigrants, other 'deviant' groups such as criminals are also anticipated to be included.

Lastly, the fourth indicator looks at the anti-establishment sentiment. This often comes in the guise of literally mentioning the government or ruling cabinets. Visually, because the 'government' is a rather abstract concept, the focus has been on symbols that identify with the government, be it flags, government buildings or people dressed in suits. Other groups such as bankers, governmental institutes or even other supranational entities (NATO, EU,...) have also been added as possibilities.

Each element was coded as being either present (1) or not (0). A sum scale of the four elements was constructed, with higher scores indicating greater presence of populist elements.

#### 4.2 *Inter-coder Reliability*

Because the data from this research hinges on the interpretation of visuals and slogans, a calculation of the inter-coder reliability was also chosen for the minimization of the bias. Of each political party, 36 randomly chosen posters (6 posters per party) were assessed by a coder with a profile similar to that of the researcher (see Table 1). In total, this therefore amounted to 36 posters, which were assessed in the same way, using the same basic table (see basic table, Annex I).

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**Table 1** *Krippendorff's alpha scores per item*

<b>SLOGANS/Total amount: 36</b>	
	Alpha
Does the slogan actively mention 'the people' or positively appeal to certain groups? ('The people' can be a several groups: Flemish, Belgian, workers, the nation, etc.)	0.887
Does the slogan identify itself with 'the people', 'the majority' or 'common sense' (e.g. We, ourselves, us, the nation, etc.)?	0.726
Are 'the people' being presented as 'threatened', or as 'oppressed' by an internal or external threat? (Oppressors could be the government, immigrants, rules, taxes, etc.)	0.885
Are certain groups excluded from 'the people'? Does a group have to adapt to 'the people' or 'the majority'? Is the excluded group considered deviant?	0.742
Does the party oppose a particular elite (the rich, the EU, NATO, the rich, etc.)?	0.803
Is this elite seen as unreliable, slow, corrupt, unfair, etc.?	0.894
<b>SCENES/Total amount: 19</b>	
Are there stereotypes, caricatures or visual metaphors (people represented as animals, double meanings, etc.) present?	0.790
Is the poster visually divided (e.g. using lines or text) into two parts or camps?	0.794
Are one or more political or cultural symbols (moon of Islam, Christian cross, Belgian flag, bow tie Di Rupo, Flemish lion, etc.) visible and portrayed in a negative light?	0.893
Is an 'honest, hard-working man', or 'the everyman', depicted?	0.886
Are 'the honest, hard-working people' presented as threatened, being in the minority or oppressed?	0.607
Are any particular groups negatively presented as 'out-groups', e.g. 'deviant', 'not a productive part of society', 'to avoid' or different from 'normal' people?	0.893
Is any out-group portrayed as corrupt, dishonest, faceless, dangerous (balaclava, knives, etc.), unreliable or negative in general?	0.780
Are the elite (the state, the government, the legal system) being visually depicted as untrustworthy, slow or corrupt?	0.886

Overall, the Krippendorff's alpha ranges from 'moderate' to 'very high'. Both tables 4 (slogans) and 5 (scenes) in Annex II provide a thorough summary of the individual inter-coder ratings. The highest scoring questions are mostly the ones that identify the literal, visual depictions of populism. The somewhat lower scoring questions (which are mostly in the range of 0.7) are typically those that not only identify, but also interpret the message sent by the party. Most of them are quite clear. Some posters label groups such as Muslims, migrants or Walloons unabashedly as 'the other' or 'the enemy'.

Some, however, especially the later ones of Vlaams Belang (which incidentally are direct copies of the German Afd), have used irony to give messages a double meaning. As mentioned above, this is a technique to deflect direct racist accusations. This was anticipated by classifying it in the first question of the 'scenes', grouped together with metaphors, stereotypes and caricatures. These categories often overlap.

**Table 2** *Items related to slogans on posters, by party*

	<b>CD&amp;V (n=25)</b>	<b>CVP (n=29)</b>	<b>VU (n=11)</b>	<b>N-VA (n=22)</b>	<b>VLAAMS BLOK (n=17)</b>	<b>VLAAMS BELANG (n=27)</b>
Mentioning 'the people'	2 (8%)	3 (10%)	2 (18%)	13 (59%)	11 (65%)	4 (15%)
Identification with 'the people'	8 (32%)	11 (38%)	3 (27%)	15 (68%)	10 (58%)	8 (30%)
Threat for 'the people'	0	1 (3%)	2 (18%)	4 (18%)	11 (65%)	15 (56%)
Exclusion	0	1 (3%)	1 (9%)	3 (14%)	10 (58%)	20 (74%)
Against the elite	0	0	1 (9%)	3 (14%)	6 (35%)	13 (48%)
Corrupt elite	0	0	1 (9%)	3 (14%)	6 (35%)	8 (30%)

**Table 3** *Items related to 'scenes' on posters, by party*

	<b>CD&amp;V (n=5)</b>	<b>CVP (n=2)</b>	<b>VU (n=2)</b>	<b>N-VA (n=12)</b>	<b>VLAAMS BLOK (n=13)</b>	<b>VLAAMS BELANG (n=24)</b>
Caricatures, Metaphors	0	0	2 (100%)	7 (58%)	9 (69%)	13 (54%)
Visual Separation	0	0	2 (100%)	5 (42%)	2 (15%)	12 (50%)
Political and cultural symbols	0	0	1 (50%)	3 (25%)	3 (23%)	9 (38%)
Depicting 'the everyman'	2 (40%)	1 (50%)	1 (50%)	8 (66%)	3 (23%)	5 (21%)
'The everyman' under attack	0	0	1 (50%)	1 (8%)	1 (7%)	8 (33%)
Out-groups present	0	0	1 (50%)	1 (8%)	1 (7%)	14 (58%)
Dangerous out-groups	0	0	1 (50%)	1 (8%)	1 (7%)	13 (54%)
Anti-elite sentiment	0	0	2 (100%)	3 (25%)	3 (23%)	6 (25%)

## 5 Analysis and Findings

The following section contains the results of this study. It is structured in order of the four research hypotheses. Each section looks at both the slogans and the 'scenes' in separate order. Following up on these hypotheses is the matter of 'pathological normalcy' and whether it applies or not.

### 5.1 Hypothesis 1

The first hypothesis (H1) is: *Populist party (Vlaams Blok/Belang) posters divide society into two segments (the righteous people versus all the 'insidious others') that are at odds with each other.*

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*Items examined: Identification with 'the people', threat for 'the people', political and cultural symbols, caricatures, metaphors*

- *Slogan*

As seen in Table 2, both Vlaams Blok and N-VA score the highest (58% and 68%, respectively) when it comes to identifying themselves with 'the people', which means that the parties divide society into two groups (good and bad) and claim to speak for the 'good people'. However, N-VA generally does not see 'the people' being threatened, as is the case with Vlaams Blok (65%) and Vlaams Belang (56%). More than half of their slogans are about a perceived threat. N-VA only had 4 out of 22 (18%) posters using this rhetoric.

A poster of Vlaams Belang literally mentions 'the elite' in its slogan (Annex III, Poster 1): 'The political elite: gets angry about the past (street names, statues, ...) – Vlaams Belang: is worried about the future (Islamic terror, immigration...) – KNOW YOUR PRIORITIES'. This poster, in particular, shows that there is an 'elite' that is supposedly completely out of touch with 'the normal people'. On top of that, by presenting its own party as the counterpoint to 'the elite', Vlaams Belang insinuates that it is part of 'the people' and speaking wholly in their name.

- *Scenes*

The tensions between 'the ordinary people' and 'the elite' can also be seen visually: Vlaams Belang had a poster in which 'the ordinary people' were being depicted as cows (Annex III, Poster 2). It insinuated that the people's livelihoods were being stolen in all kinds of ways by 'the elite', which was the government in this case.

The 'ordinary people' are, however, not depicted as being that helpless by the populist Vlaams Blok/Belang. In many posters they speak about fighting back (against the supposed elite). This 'fight' is symbolized by the use of certain objects: pencils (Vlaams Belang), brooms (Vlaams Blok) or boxing gloves (Vlaams Blok/Belang). These tools serve as metaphors in the fight against the 'elite'. This is where Vlaams Blok scores highest (69%) on metaphors and caricatures (when disregarding the VU with higher, skewed results).

All in all, when looking at both the slogans and the scenes, it appears that the populist Vlaams Blok/Belang does indeed focus more on the conflicts and exclusion between 'the pure people' and the elite, when compared with the other parties.

## 5.2 Hypothesis 2

For the second hypothesis (H2), we look more closely at the 'pure, hard-working' people: *Populist (Vlaams Blok/Belang) posters refer to the 'pure, hard-working' people more often than non-populist party posters.*

*Items examined: mentioning 'the people', identification with 'the people', depicting 'the everyman'.*

- *Slogan*

The populist parties are not the ones that mention ‘the people’ the most. The right-wing conservative N-VA mentions ‘the people’ more, with 59% of all slogans having some sort of reference to them. This type of poster almost always identified themselves as being an integral part of the Flemish population (which became, in part, true later on, as they became the biggest Flemish party). 15 out of 22 slogans claimed to speak directly on behalf of ‘the pure, hard-working people’. To be more specific, those were often the numerous references made to Flanders and Flemings. ‘Voor zes miljoen Vlamingen’ (For six million Flemings) was one of their most ubiquitous slogans in their earlier campaigns.

The Christian Democrats (CVP and CD&V), on the other hand, score lower (CVP: 38% and CD&V: 32%) altogether on identification with ‘the people’ slogans, as seen in Table 2. They use the terms ‘our’ and ‘us’ in a different way: inclusive and multifaceted. There is also no latent nostalgia apparent, as is the case with Vlaams Blok/Belang, in which ‘the people’ have to ‘reclaim what’s theirs’ from an ‘out-group’. The term ‘the people’ is being used here as a way to connect to others and not alienate others, as the populist right does.

The Volksunie scores 27% when it comes to ‘identifying with the people’. Slogans such as ‘Met hart en ziel voor Vlaanderen’ (With heart and soul for Flanders) are good examples.

- *Scenes*

The N-VA also scores the highest (66%) on the visual depiction of ‘the pure, hard-working people’, colloquially known as ‘the everyman’. Their posters feature certain archetypes such as ‘the elderly pensioner’ or ‘the young family with children’ in order to appeal to ‘pure, hard-working people’. They are depicted smiling and being in harmony with their surroundings, which equals Flanders. Barring one poster, they are never shown to be under threat.

This is in stark contrast to the populist parties Vlaams Blok and Vlaams Belang. When they depict ‘the pure, hard-working people’, it is always in tandem with them being threatened one way or another.

The reason for this can be traced to the slogan ‘eigen volk eerst’ (own people first) with Vlaams Blok. With ‘own people’ they mean native, white Flemish people (as can be seen in several of their posters), who are, according to them, ‘oppressed’; hence, the ‘own people’ need to be placed first again. This ties in with ‘welfare chauvinism’, which argues that a massive influx of migrants will surely cause the deterioration of the social welfare system. At a deeper level, it believes that it is immoral to help others (immigrants) before helping one’s own (natives), regardless of the situation (Mewes & Mau, 2013; Mudde, 2002). Vlaams Belang follows the same patterns, albeit with different slogans and an even harder nativist stand.

All things considered, the populist parties were not the ones that referred the most to the ‘hard-working people’. When looking at the data, it was the N-VA that did this the most.

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### 5.3 Hypothesis 3

This leads to the third hypothesis (H3): *Populist (Vlaams Blok/Belang) posters shift the blame more often onto out-groups (such as immigrants) than do non-populist party posters.*

*Items examined: threat to the people, exclusion, stereotypes – caricatures, visual separation, out-groups present, dangerous out-groups*

- *Slogan*

The figures in Table 2 show that the slogans of the Vlaams Blok and Belang score particularly high on identifying alleged threats against ‘the people’. Both identify themselves as ‘one of’ the people and claim to speak entirely in their name (‘thin’ populism) and they express anti-immigration and anti-establishment sentiment. This has also been called ‘complete’ populism (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007).

Alleged threats include criminals, immigrants and the government. This is in contrast to, for example, the Christian Democrats (CD&V and CVP), which score very low in general when it comes to threats against the people and exclusion (of ‘others’). Volksunie produced similarly low results.

The N-VA veers into populist territory on some occasions: more recent slogans of N-VA touch upon migration, which was also the position of prominent N-VA member Theo Francken, the then minister in charge of migration. Their message is conservative in nature and argues in favour of closing down all borders in order to control migration (Annex III, Poster 3), which is an echo of the same rhetoric Vlaams Belang has been using for decades (Coffé, 2005a).

There is a difference however, when it comes to ‘exclusion’ (of those deemed ‘others’). Figures show that a big shift took place between Vlaams Blok and Vlaams Belang. With Vlaams Belang posters, the emphasis has shifted in favour of exclusion and ‘law-and-order’ approaches. As Table 2 shows, 58% of the Vlaams Blok slogans were about excluding ‘the other’ or the need for ‘the other’ to adapt to the ‘norm’, whereas that became 74% for Vlaams Belang. This means that out of 17 posters for Vlaams Blok, 10 were about excluding the ‘other’, whereas this was the case with 20 out of 27 posters with Vlaams Belang.

- *Scenes*

Vlaams Blok/Belang link the dangerous elements in society often exclusively to migrants and Muslims. This becomes most evident when looking at their depictions of these ‘others’. 58% of all posters of Vlaams Belang identified some kind of out-group that is different from the ‘normal’ people. These ‘out-groups’ are almost exclusively immigrants. Threatening images, complete with unsavoury, dangerous types are one of the most familiar, recurring scenes in the communication of the Vlaams Belang. 13 out of 24 (or 54%) posters depicted these kinds of scenes (see Table 3). As mentioned earlier, the ‘others’ that are dangerous and to be avoided typically fall into three categories for the populist Vlaams Blok/Belang: immigrants, Muslims or the government. Immigrants are often visualized as a big, faceless ‘horde’ of dark-skinned people that threaten to overwhelm the country. Muslims are characterized in stereotypical fashion with flying carpets, kafbans and long beards (Annex III, Poster 4). Other elements include mosques, bur-



gas and curved swords. These kinds of scenes are the reason why Vlaams Belang scored 54% on metaphors and caricatures.

Half of the posters (12 out of 24) of Vlaams Belang depict a visual separation, be it with lines, borders or walls of text. In most cases, these visual borders separate the immigrants from 'the pure people' or the country they wish to enter. The N-VA also scores high (42%) on drawn borders, but these function more as a safe 'blanket' that protects, rather than separates (Annex III, Poster 5).

The other mainstream parties simply do not engage in any similar kind of characterization of out-groups. The difference between Vlaams Belang and N-VA is the fact that the N-VA does not actively portray people with different cultural/ethnic backgrounds as 'dangerous' and to be avoided. On the contrary, they have made a poster with two ethnically diverse electoral candidates raising a banner with the 'Eigen volk samen' (Our own people together) (Annex III, Poster 6) slogan. It is a play of words on the old Vlaams Blok slogan 'Eigen volk eerst' (Own people first).

Overall, it can be surmised that populist posters do indeed shift the blame more onto out-groups. They also visualize them in more detail than the other parties.

#### 5.4 Hypothesis 4

The fourth hypothesis (H4) is: *Populist (Vlaams Blok/Belang) posters tend to take a stronger anti-establishment stance than non-populist party posters.*

*Items examined: Against the elite, corrupt elite, anti-elite sentiment*

- *Slogan*

Anti-establishment politics are one of the best-known features of the Vlaams Blok and Vlaams Belang, which is indeed also reflected in their slogans. This is partly because of the cordon sanitaire that ensured that all other parties would never enter into a coalition with the Blok/Belang (Coffé et al., 2007). The anti-establishment policy also stems in part from the anti-immigration policy, because both Vlaams Blok and Vlaams Belang hold the ruling parties responsible for the migration influx. Furthermore, Vlaams Blok and Belang accuse the Belgian government of channelling more money to Wallonia than to Flanders.

Both Vlaams Blok and Belang score the highest against 'elites'. But percentage-wise, when it comes to slogans, Vlaams Belang scores the overall highest (48%). They more often explicitly call out the government as corrupt or untrustworthy. Vlaams Blok, albeit lower scoring against the elite (35%), also made slogans that argued that the government is 'in need of a good clean up' (Annex III, Poster 7). It is also telling that both parties score marginally higher when calling the elite 'corrupt'. 35% of all slogans of the Vlaams Blok called the elite 'corrupt' or 'dangerous' in some way. 30% of the slogans of Vlaams Belang echoed that same sentiment. The N-VA, the third highest scoring party, only scores 14% on that matter.

When it comes to the N-VA, a few posters contain slogans that criticize the cabinet of Elio Di Rupo, who was then prime minister. Other N-VA posters call for a more autonomous Flanders (Annex III, Poster 8).

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From its inception as a splinter party from the Volksunie onwards, Vlaams Blok/Belang has always been fervently anti-establishment. This is why they score relatively high (Vlaams Blok: 35%, Vlaams Belang: 48%) against elites when compared with other parties. As mentioned earlier, they are critical of the entire political system. This mainly stems from the cordon sanitaire. The parties embraced their 'outsider' status and anti-immigration focus, which proved to be a good combination. The N-VA also has some slogans that are anti-elite (14%, which is 3 out of 22). These posters primarily criticized their biggest opponent on the federal level, the Walloon PS. Once the N-VA becomes a ruling party, most of the anti-elite sentiment fades away.

Conversely, the CVP and CD&V, which were almost always in office at the time, have a non-existent anti-elite sentiment.

- *Scenes*

When it comes to anti-elite sentiment, a major bone of contention is the alleged monetary transfers from Flanders to Wallonia, which according to the populist right (Vlaams Blok/Belang) puts Flanders at a disadvantage. The conservative N-VA identified the problem by displaying a traffic sign warning with a bow tie on it, with the slogan 'Laat Vlaanderen niet verst(r)ikken' ('Don't let Flanders choke'), a reference to former Walloon prime minister Elio Di Rupo, who often wears a bow tie.

N-VA also used the poster 'Afruit Vlaanderen, uitrit crisis' ('Exitway Flanders, exit crisis') to signal the problem of the monetary transfers to Wallonia. It is visualized as a traffic sign. It argues that a stronger, more independent Flanders is needed to solve the problem with Wallonia.

Vlaams Belang came up with a poster in which a Flemish piggy bank cuts off the leg of a Walloon rooster (Annex III, Poster 9). The rooster is the heraldic personification of Wallonia, while the piggy bank symbolizes the supposed unjust treatment of Flanders when it comes to monetary transfers.

Communal and linguistic problems are focused on by both, but with different approaches. Vlaams Belang is more focused on the conflict itself, while the N-VA focuses more on the solution than the problem. This, in turn, proves to be more 'constructive' than the rather negative rhetoric that Vlaams Belang uses. Add to this the fact that anger and fear are far better at attracting one's attention.

Other anti-establishment posters of Vlaams Belang are about being 'milked like cows' (see Annex III, Poster 2), and the liberals, socialists and Christian Democrats are portrayed as incompetent 'monkeys' (see Annex III, Poster 10) who are deaf, blind and mute (hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil).

Both populist parties are against the establishment; however, not many posters visually depict this subject. Only 3 out of 13 Vlaams Blok posters and 6 out of 25 Vlaams Belang posters had a visual depiction of the 'establishment'. Some of these depictions include monkeys with placards depicting political groups (Vlaams Belang), buildings (Vlaams Blok) or caricatures of politicians (Vlaams Belang). Because of the 'cordon sanitaire', both Vlaams Blok/Belang view the entire political system as unjust.

Finally, there is a difference in respect of levels of anti-elite sentiment. Vlaams Belang is Eurosceptic but is willing to defend the EU when it comes to blocking membership of Turkey. This is visualized as a herd of European white sheep that kick the black sheep back into Turkish territory. This might indicate that the cultural and religious differences (Islam versus the West) might represent a greater concern to Vlaams Belang than anti-elitist sentiment against the European Union.

All things considered, however, and barring the VU because they only had two workable posters, both Vlaams Blok and Vlaams Belang score highest when it comes to anti-elite sentiment, leading to a confirmation of H4.

## 6 Conclusion and Discussion

In this article, the visuals on the posters of the Flemish populist right party Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang were studied. The question was whether these posters showed more overall antagonism, more appeals to 'the regular people', more anti-elite sentiment and a higher degree of anti-out-group sentiment compared with those of mainstream parties.

The analysis shows that there is indeed a 'populist' use of images. Visually, the populist elements are conveyed mainly through (negative) metaphors, caricatures and the use of so-called 'agonic' visual techniques, in which a negative scene is often shown that supposedly can be avoided by voting on the party in question. Overall, the pervasive worldview in the populist posters is that society, as a whole, is divided into two camps: the 'good' (the pure, hard-working, incorruptible everyman) and the 'bad' (migrants, elites, other parties, etc.). As such, the first hypothesis (*'Populist party (Vlaams Blok/Belang) posters divide society into two segments that are at odds with each other.'*) was confirmed.

The situation is different in regard to the second hypothesis. The problem lies with indicating the 'pure, righteous people'. This 'pure' people concept is something that is very commonly used in the electoral rhetoric of the Vlaams Blok. It is also present within the Vlaams Belang rhetoric, albeit lower. However, overall, both with slogans and 'scenes', the N-VA scores highest when it comes to mentioning, identifying with and visually representing 'the pure people'.

The difference, however, lies not only in the naming of this concept, but also in the act of pitting the 'pure people' against another entity, usually the 'elite' or 'migrants'. With the N-VA, the pure people are 'united' but in a purely inclusive, heterogeneous sense, in contrast to Vlaams Blok and Belang, which subvert the same concept to a rather homogeneous, nativist context. All populists use the term 'the good, pure hard-working people', but not everyone who appeals to these 'pure people' is necessarily populist per se. This has already been called 'empty populism' (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007).

All in all, the N-VA appeals more to the people than the other observed parties. As such, the second hypothesis (*'Populist (Vlaams Blok/Belang) posters refer to the 'pure, hard-working' people more often than non-populist party posters'*) must be rejected.

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The third hypothesis investigated the out-groups and whether or not populist parties put the blame more on them rather than on other parties. H3: *Populist (Vlaams Blok/Belang) posters shift the blame more often onto out-groups (such as immigrants) than non-populist party posters.*

For the populist parties, Vlaams Belang is somewhat more outspoken than Vlaams Blok. Vlaams Belang places the emphasis more on the 'out-groups' and also depicts them as a greater threat than the Vlaams Blok. What should not be forgotten is that significantly fewer posters with scenes are used for Vlaams Blok (n = 13) than for Vlaams Belang (n = 24), distorting the results somewhat.

As mentioned earlier, most of the 'out-groups' portrayed by the Vlaams Blok/Belang are either Muslims, immigrants or the 'elite', which is most often equated to the government. In their slogans as well as in the depicted scenes, both Vlaams Blok and Vlaams Belang score the highest when it comes to defining out-groups, excluding them and arguing that they are dangerous threats. This is in contrast to the N-VA (who scored third highest on 'excluding others'), as the party barely scores 20%, while Vlaams Blok (58%) and Vlaams Belang (74%) score significantly higher. As such, the third hypothesis cannot be rejected.

The final hypothesis (H4) argues that populist (Vlaams Blok/Belang) posters tend to take a stronger anti-establishment stance than non-populist party posters.

The government is one of the biggest antagonists for Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang, partly for historic reasons (cordon sanitaire), and partly also because they hold them responsible for all the problems that arise on account of migration.

From observations of the rhetoric on the posters it appears that the Vlaams Blok and Vlaams Belang generally treat the same points in a certain way as their mainstream counterparts, especially the N-VA. Monetary transfers to Wallonia, for example, are a point of contention that both parties like to highlight. Whereas the N-VA approached it with the slogan 'Afrit Vlaanderen, uitrit crisis' ('Exitway Flanders, exit crisis'), Vlaams Belang came up with a poster in which a Flemish piggy bank attacks the leg of the Walloon rooster. Communal problems are focused on by both, but with different approaches. The Vlaams Blok/Belang is more focused on the conflict itself, while the N-VA focuses more on the solution than the problem. The same can be said about the issues concerning security. The N-VA shows smiling faces with a slogan promising a 'safe Flanders', whereas Vlaams Belang puts (fictional) mugshots of criminals on full display.

All in all, their anti-establishment rhetoric is noticeably higher than that of other mainstream parties, and hence the final hypothesis is accepted.

This research, of course, has its limitations. Owing to the problem that some parties had significantly fewer posters to analyse, especially the older, earlier 1990s posters that were published before the internet became widespread, some parties (like the VU) have distorted statistics.

That said, this was an exploratory study that offers various avenues for further research. Further research paths could focus on Germany, France or Great Britain, to name but a few other countries. Coupled with this, a study between countries could be conducted, such as an analysis between different populist parties, both left and right, both old or new.

As Mudde (2004) has described, there is also a kind of contamination in certain countries under way in which populist language seeps into traditional non-populist parties. This could be another research avenue: To what extent do non-populist parties use populist imagery? What are the effects? How do the populist parties themselves react?

Since this phenomenon is prevalent among parties that are at the extremes of the political spectrum, a possible track to future studies would be to conduct the same visual content analysis within populist left-wing circles. In addition, according to the so-called Horseshoe model, there should be a lot of common ground between populist left and populist right. 'Les extrêmes se touchent'. It would therefore also offer the possibility to see the extent to which the populist parties differ not only from the mainstream but also from each other's extreme opposite.

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## Annex I: Basic Table

<b>Slogan: 'The People'</b>	<b>No = 0 Yes = 1</b>
Does the slogan actively mention 'the people' or positively appeal to certain groups? ('The People' can be several groups: Flemish, Belgian, workers, the nation, etc.)	
Does the slogan identify itself with 'the people', 'the majority' or 'common sense' (e.g. we, ourselves, us, the nation, etc.)?	
Are 'the people' being presented as 'threatened', or as 'oppressed' by an internal or external threat? (Oppressors could be: the government, immigrants, rules, taxes, etc.)	
Are certain groups excluded from 'the people'? Does a group have to adapt to 'the people' or 'the majority'? Is the excluded group considered deviant?	
<b>Total</b>	

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**Slogan: Anti-establishment sentiment****No = 0 Yes = 1**

Does the party oppose a particular elite (the rich, the EU, NATO, the rich, etc.)?

Is this elite seen as unreliable, slow, corrupt, unfair, etc.?

**Total****Posters with 'scenes'****No Yes**

Are there stereotypes, caricatures or visual metaphors (people represented as animals, double meanings, etc.) present?

Is the poster visually divided (e.g. using lines or text) into two parts or camps?

Are one or more political or cultural symbols (moon of Islam, Christian cross, Belgian flag, bow tie Di Rupo, Flemish lion, etc.) visible and portrayed in a negative light?

Is an 'honest, hard-working man', or 'the everyman', depicted? (Exclude all politicians portrayed promoting themselves.)

Are 'the honest, hard-working people' presented as threatened, being in the minority or oppressed?

Are any particular groups negatively presented as 'out-groups', e.g. 'deviant', 'not a productive part of society', 'to avoid' or different from 'normal' people?

Is any out-group portrayed as corrupt, dishonest, faceless, dangerous (balaclava, knives, etc.), unreliable or negative in general?

Are the elite (the state, the government, the legal system) being visually depicted as untrustworthy, slow or corrupt?

**Total****Annex II: Inter-coding Ratings****Table 4** *Inter-coder ratings slogans*

	<b>Both Agree</b>	<b>Both Disagree</b>	<b>Coder 1 only Agrees</b>	<b>Coder 2 only Agrees</b>	<b>Cohen's Kappa</b>	<b>Krippendorff's Alpha</b>
Mentioning 'the people'	14	20	1	1	0.886	0.887
Identification with 'the people'	15	16	2	3	0.722	0.726
Threat for 'the people'	13	21	1	1	0.883	0.885
Exclusion	9	23	0	4	0.742	0.742
Against the elite	5	29	0	2	0.801	0.803
Corrupt elite	5	30	0	1	0.893	0.894

**Table 5** *Inter-coder ratings 'scenes'*

	<b>Both Agree</b>	<b>Both Disagree</b>	<b>Coder 1 only Agrees</b>	<b>Coder 2 only Agrees</b>	<b>Cohen's Kappa</b>	<b>Krippendorff's Alpha</b>
Caricatures-metaphors	10	7	1	1	0.784	0.79
Visible separation	9	8	2	0	0.791	0.794
Political and cult symbols	7	11	1	0	0.89	0.893
Depicting 'the everyman'	6	12	1	0	0.883	0.886
'The everyman' under attack	2	15	1	1	0.595	0.607
Out-groups present	7	11	0	1	0.89	0.893
Dangerous out-groups	6	11	1	1	0.774	0.78
Anti-elite sentiment	6	12	0	1	0.883	0.886

### Annex III: Example Posters

Poster 1: Vlaams Belang, 'Know your priorities', 2017



Kevin Straetemans

Poster 2: Vlaams Belang, 'Genoeg gemolken, geef ons geld terug' ('Enough being milked, give us back our money'), 2013



Poster 3: N-VA, 'België kan niet alle asielzoekers van de wereld opvangen' ('Belgium cannot take in all of the world's refugees'), 2016



Poster 4: Vlaams Belang, 'Ardooisesteenweg 2020-2030?', 2012



Poster 5: N-VA, 'Veilig thuis in een welvarend Vlaanderen' ('A safe home in a prosperous Flanders'), 2017



Poster 6: N-VA, 'Eigen volk samen' ('Own people together'), 2007



Poster 7: Vlaams Blok, 'Grote kuis!' ('Cleaning time!'), 1995



Kevin Straetemans

Poster 8: N-VA, 'Afrist Vlaanderen, uitrit crisis' ('exitway Flanders, exit crisis'), 2009



Poster 9: Vlaams Belang, 'Vlaams geld in Vlaamse handen!' ('Flemish money in Flemish hands!'), 2009



Poster 10: Vlaams Belang, 'Het enige alternatief' ('The only alternative'), 2007

