

26 THE MOST IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY SINCE 2004 FROM HUNGARIAN PERSPECTIVE

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26.1 INTRODUCTION

With the entry of the Lisbon Treaty into force (on 1 December 2009), the legal and institutional framework of EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) significantly changed in terms of its internal support and implementation as well as external representation structure. For its analysis, we will first examine the institutional and legal consequences resulting from the Reform Treaty concluded in Lisbon. Then, the functioning of the new institutional system and system of division of competences within CFSP during the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the European Union (HU EU Presidency) in 2011 is explained as the actual initial period of the new institutional system in practice.

After the brief assessment of the institutional and legal framework framing CFSP, three key areas of EU foreign and security policy – enlargement, Eastern Partnership as well as common security and defence policy – are going to be reviewed illustrating distinct Hungarian foreign policy interests and activities since the participation of the country in the implementation of CFSP.

26.2 THE INSTITUTIONAL ‘(R)EVOLUTION’ OF THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY: THE INNOVATIONS IN THE TREATY IN LISBON

Ever since its creation, the European Union has been characterized by debates on the division of competences between the national and supranational levels of decision-making and policy implementation. New provisions introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon significantly

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changed the decision-making system and the catalogue of competences exercised by the Union.¹

According to earlier researches and surveys,² European citizens unequivocally support the ‘communitarization’ of EU foreign affairs which would imply the delegation of certain parts of foreign policy decision-making competences to European level. According to many European citizens a truly common foreign policy can be one of the instruments of strengthening the legitimacy of the Union. ‘In other words, if the Union can act uniformly in the global political sphere burdened by conflicts, its internal legitimacy can grow. According to the respondents, however, the EU still does not represent a unified position in the most important issues of global foreign policy and the existing ‘cacophony’ prejudices the common interests of the continent.’³ Nevertheless, foreign and defence policies remain the most sensitive and carefully guarded aspects of the sovereignty of Member States.

With respect to the worldwide visibility and presence of the Union, one of the main aims of the Treaty of Lisbon was to further strengthen the international role of the EU. The adopted reforms in the realm of external relations were intended to enhance the coherence and impact of CFSP. For these strategic goals, the Treaty of Lisbon brought about two significant innovations: redefined the role and extended the competences of the High Representative of the EU in its external relations,⁴ and introduced the European External Action Service (EEAS).⁵

Before Lisbon, within the Union two different persons exercised the powers of the EU representative in international relations: the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) accountable to the Council as the Secretary-General of the Council (the head of the administrative institutional support for the Council of the EU) and the Commissioner for External Relations as a member of the European Commission. The Treaty of Lisbon merged the duties and powers of both officials into the responsibilities of the new ‘chief executive’ of CFSP under the official title of the ‘High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’ (EUHR for FASP). The resulting new ‘double-hatted’ foreign policy principal of the EU acts on the one hand, as the Vice-President of the Commission supposedly autonomous from Member States and, on the other hand, is answerable to the foreign ministers of EU members in the Council in his/her capacity as as the political head of the EEAS.

Despite the extension of its competences, the High Representative of the Union is not alone responsible for the external representation of the EU. The Treaty on the European

1 Art. 5, Treaty on European Union. Arts. 2-6, 21 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

2 Grúber Károly: Gazdasági óriás, politikai törpe?: Legitimáció és az Unió közös külpolitikája, *Európai Tükör*, Vol. 11, No. 11, 2006, pp. 67-72.

3 Ibid.

4 Arts. 18 and 27, TEU.

5 Art. 27(3).

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Union (TEU) after Lisbon also empowered the President of the European Council to represent the Union externally at his level and in his capacity without prejudice to the competences of the High Representative.⁶ Since treaty provisions do not specify the division of responsibilities between the two officials, the coordination of their respective roles had to evolve in practice. As the experience of the first period of the new positions demonstrated the division of labour functioned effectively between the High Representative (Catherine Ashton) and the President of the European Council (Herman Van Rompuy) during their terms in office from 2009 to 2014. In line with the pertinent provisions, the High Representative contributes to the development of CFSP and conducts its implementation. First, he/she is empowered to initiate and drive the elaboration of the various components and threads of foreign and security policy at EU level through proposals to the Foreign Affairs Council and to the European Council as well. As the institutional representative of the Council, the EUHR carries out political decisions and policy measures adopted by the Member States (in ministerial or ambassadorial format) and conducts political dialogue with third parties. The High Representative also presents and conveys the position of the European Union in international organizations or at international diplomatic conferences.

The tasks of the ‘double-hatted’ (Council official and Commissioner) High Representative combine duties in both institutional dimensions of EU external relations:

- in the Council, the EU HR ensures the coherence and continuity of the work in relation to the Union’s external policies. For these purposes, the High Representative also chairs the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) and sets the agenda of its meetings;
- in the Commission, she is responsible for all the tasks related to external relations which fall within its competence. Furthermore, she shall ensure the harmonization of foreign policy with other Commission policies and services.

The other institutional innovation of the Treaty of Lisbon was the establishment of the European External Action Service. In terms of its institutional construction, the EEAS was composed of various elements and responsibilities of the External Relations (RELEX) Directorate General (DG) of the European Commission and components (the Policy Unit and other structures) of the General Secretariat of the Council. With regard to the personnel composition, besides the staff members of the transferred units from the Commission and the Council, diplomats from the foreign ministries of EU Member States could join the new EU diplomatic service. The Council Regulation establishing the Service stipulated that the number of the Member States diplomats shall reach 1/3 as soon as possible (it was completed by the summer of 2013).⁷

⁶ Art. 15 (6), TEU.

⁷ Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service (2010/427/EU), OJ L 201/30, 23 August 2010.

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The European External Action Service works under the direct authority of the EU HR. The High Representative appoints a senior official of the EEAS to chair the meetings of the CFSP ambassadors of Member States (in the format of Political and Security Committee, PSC).

The President of the European Council, the President of the Commission and other commissioners may request assistance from the European External Action Service regarding issues concerning the foreign policy of the Union.

26.3 THE HUNGARIAN EU PRESIDENCY: TESTING THE NEW POST-LISBON INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM

The EEAS commenced its activity on 1 December 2010 and the Hungarian EU Presidency began one month later (1 January 2011). The first real test of the new institution began practically simultaneously with the first period for Hungary with the responsibility to orchestrate the sessions of the Council, apart from the meetings of the foreign ministers (Foreign Affairs Council) which had to be conducted by the High Representative and the EU diplomatic service.

After the establishment of the EEAS, Hungary faced a institutional uncertainty: actually no one knew how the 'post-Lisbon' system would work in practice after the role of the rotating presidency was diminished in CFSP and most of its competences were transferred to the EAAS. In order to clarify the practical issues of how the new system could work, the Hungarian government established a task force with the representatives of the Hungarian EU Presidency, the Commission, the EEAS, the General Secretariat of the Commission and of the Council in October 2010. The Hungarian EU Presidency made its ambitions clear already in the preparatory phase (within the Task Force) of this establishment of the EEAS, which was a 'quasi virtual' institution at that time, that Hungary was looking for practical solutions which were in accordance with the Treaty. The initial institutional uncertainty was compounded also by a significant lack of trust. This attitude could have made the necessary cooperation between the EEAS and the rotating presidency already in this early phase more difficult if Hungary had not shown flexibility to provided pragmatic and applicable institutional answers.

The 'supporting presidency' model in CFSP – first elaborated and tested in practice by the Hungarian EU Presidency – proved not to be easy to implement since it coincided with the birth of the new post-Lisbon institutional structure of external relations. However, later it became a model for the cooperation between any future rotating presidency and the EEAS. In the new arrangement, horizontal coordination between the Council configurations presided by a Member State (first, Hungarian) presidency and the Foreign Affairs Council presided by the EEAS functioned well.

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The Hungarian PSC team successfully carried out its coordination tasks in the uncertain environment arising from the new institutional situation with the assistance of the representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior. The main duties and results and of the supporting role of the Hungarian EU Presidency were the following:

26.3.1 *Substituting the EU High Representative*

The lack of a real political deputy of the High Representative is one of the most unfortunate deficiencies of the Treaty.⁸ This however creates a mutual dependency – which can be beneficial for sides from time to time – between the High Representative and the EEAS as well as the foreign minister and the foreign ministry of the Member State presiding over the Council. This dependence is made more difficult by the high expectations of third countries, with which the EU is supposed to continue the normal conduct of foreign policy. In order to be able to satisfy those expectations, the European partners need to cooperate smoothly. This close cooperation led to mutual trust by the end of the Presidency period.

Catherine Ashton spent approximately 200 days abroad and received invitations to 500 events in 2010.⁹ Consequently, at the request of the High Representative the Hungarian foreign minister or deputy foreign minister represented the Union in political dialogues with third countries more than 20 times, including with such important partners as Israel and Turkey as well as at regional meetings such as the EU-Central Asia security dialogue. Having orchestrated the EU-ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific countries) meeting, Hungary could enjoy the benefits of this particular opportunity to build up connections with several countries with which it did not have diplomatic relations earlier. This experience proved particularly useful later in the process of the so-called ‘global opening’ of the Hungarian diplomacy.¹⁰

8 Karoly Gruber-Csaba Toro: PSC: az EU kül- és biztonságpolitikája és magyar szempontból legfontosabb fejleményei in Attila Marján (ed.): *Magyarország első évtizede az Európai Unióban: 2004-2014*, Nemzeti Közszerkeletati Egyetem, Budapest, 2014, p. 89.

9 This information was provided by the cabinet of the EU High Representative for Károly Gruber as the Hungarian PSC ambassador at that time.

10 On behalf of the EU: János Martonyi, Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs chaired:
ASEAN-EU Post-Ministerial Conference – Hanoi (22nd-23rd July 2010)
EU-Tajikistan Cooperation Council (13rd December 2010)
EU-Israel Association Council (22nd February 2011)
EU-Central Asia Foreign Ministerial Meeting – Taskent (7th April 2011)
EU-Croatia Association Council (19th April 2011)
EU-Turkey Association Council (19th April 2011)
EU-ACP Joint Parliamentary Assembly (16th-18th May 2011)
EU-EGT political dialogue (23rd May 2011)
EU-ACP Ministerial Council Meeting (31st May)
EU-Algeria Association Council (21st June 2011)

26.3.2 *Informal Meetings*

The organisation of informal meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council and its various working groups – in close cooperation with the High Representative and the EEAS – is the competence and duty of the rotating presidency. As a result of the occasionally over-centralised and bureaucratic management method of the secretariat of the EU High Representative the preparation of these meetings was usually slow and difficult, which caused some inconveniences for Member States. At the same time, the chairing of these meetings by the representatives of the rotating presidency proved to be more successful. In addition, Hungary also preserved the right to organise and host the visits and fieldtrips of various working groups (PSC, COEST, COWEB, CivCom etc.) to third countries and Hungary, which provided adequate visibility for the EU Presidency including our local representations and embassies.

26.3.3 *The Role of the Hungarian EU Presidency in the External Representation of the Union (Local Presidency)*

The role of the Hungarian embassies and delegations in third countries proved to be one of the most prominent instruments of support by the Presidency. During her Presidency, Hungary represented the European Union – since there are no EU delegations in these locations – in Argentina, at the Holy See, in Jordan, in Kuwait, in Qatar, in the United Arab Emirates and partially in Kosovo and in Shanghai (China) and in important, but difficult third countries such as Cuba, Iran, Belarus and last but not least Libya (The Hungarian Embassy in Tripoli carried out its task in an extremely difficult environment burdened by civil wars and it ensured high visibility for the Hungarian EU Presidency). The successful performance of Hungary in Tripoli was illustrated by the fact that both the EU High Representative and the American foreign minister expressed their appreciation and acknowledgement of the Hungarian ambassador in Libya for his work and achievements (such as assistance for Western journalists to escape from danger and possible captivity).

On behalf of the EU: Zsolt Németh Parliamentary Secretary of State, Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs chaired:

EU-Armenia, EU-Azerbaijan, EU-Georgia Cooperation Councils (7th December 2010)

informal sessions of ministers for development (22nd February 2011)

EU-Moldova Cooperation Council (5th May 2011)

Montenegro SAA Council (21st June 2011)

On the EU's behalf: János Hóvári, Deputy Secretary of State chaired:

Consultation with Guinea-Bissau pursuant to Art. 96 of Cotonou Agreement (29th March 2011)

Replacements in the European Parliament:

In March 2011 Enikő Győri and in April 2011 Zsolt Németh replaced the High Representative in thematic debates on foreign affairs in the European Parliament.

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The work of the Hungarian embassies was highly recognizable (reports, demarches, preparation of sanctions, preparing human rights and other country reports), in particular of those operating in hostile or difficult environments.

In several international organisations (UN and its agencies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UNESCO, etc.), Hungarian diplomats carried out tasks as a Member State presiding the Council on the basis of the principle of shared competences.

26.3.4 *The EU-ASEM (Asia-Europe) Meeting and Other Presidency Events
in Hungary*

Beside the informal Council meetings of ministers of defence and foreign affairs, and other important programmes (meetings of political directors and defence policy directors) the major domestically organised events of the Hungarian EU Presidency mostly dealt with Asian themes. The EU-Japan symposium jointly organised by Hungarian and Japan partners was held on 3rd March 2011 in Budapest.¹¹ Another similar event, the EU-China strategic dialogue also took place in Hungary in May 2011.¹² Between 6th and 7th June 2011 the 10th Ministerial Conference of the Asia-Europe Meeting was held in Gödöllő, Hungary. The biannual meeting of foreign ministers of 46 countries – together with the Secretariat of ASEAN and the European External Action Service – was co-chaired by High Representative Catherine Ashton and Foreign Minister János Martonyi. At this high priority meeting, the Chinese, the Indian and the Japan Foreign Ministers participated at the same time. The meeting was unanimously evaluated by the participants as an outstanding success and was the major CFSP event of the period of the Hungarian EU Presidency. Hungary not only hosted the meeting but also played an active role in the preparation of the memorandum adopted at the end of the meeting and in continuing the ASEM process as one of the coordinators of the European side.

26.3.5 *The Role of the PSC in the Decision-Making Mechanisms of the Council*

The major part of the co-ordination of the external relations activities of the Presidency were carried out by the diplomatic team – responsible for CSFP matters – based in Brussels at the Permanent Representation of Hungary to the EU in close cooperation with the corresponding departments of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Budapest.

11 *The presidency takes action to develop the connections between the EU and Asia*, 4 March 2011, www.eu2011.hu/news/presidency-takes-action-develop-connections-between-eu-and-asia#sthash.xtL0IERD.dpuf.

12 *EU-China Relations: Chronology*, European External Action Service: EU Relations with China, http://eeas.europa.eu/china/docs/chronology__2014_en.pdf.

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Their daily coordination with functioned well from the onset of the Presidency which at times took over some of the duties of the EEAS (e.g. direct communication with the delegations of the incumbent Presidency).

The main difficulty of coordination was to maintain the principle of indivisibility of the Council. The PSC-team tried to ensure – as far as possible – the efficiency of the coordination between the EEAS and the structures under the national presidency. This feature of the post-Lisbon arrangement requires further refinement; however, it can be argued that the Hungarian EU Presidency shaped and supported the functions of an evolving new CFSP institutional system which should reconcile and reflect the common denominator of national interests of the contributing member state.

26.4 THE STRATEGIC EVALUATION OF THE HUNGARIAN EU-PRESIDENCY IN THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM

On the basis of feedback from the EU institutions and Member States, the Hungarian semester at the helm of the Council was deemed successful from the perspective of the formation of a novel institutional operation in EU foreign policy in spite of the constantly changing international environment (economic crisis management, Arab Spring, Japanese nuclear catastrophe, etc).

During the six months of the HU EU Presidency, it turned out that in the new institutional structure the Member State presiding over the Council continued to have an important role in the implementation of the foreign policy agenda of the Union. While this supporting presidency ensures a restricted role only in the institutional balance, it is an essential component of the smooth functioning of the post-Lisbon institutional structure of EU foreign relations. Hungary had to address the deficiencies of the Treaty in the area of CFSP in practice; the Hungarian EU-Presidency managed to introduce a model practice which was shaped and refined during its 6 months long period.

As part of the new institutional model, Hungary ensured the continuity of the system of foreign relations (replacement of the High Representative), of delegations (local presidencies in difficult relations) of the EU. In addition, Hungary provided new impetus to the Union's foreign policy thinking in several areas of global importance through conferences and special meetings.

As the Member State in charge of the Presidency, Hungary maintained the 'principle of one and indivisible Council' as well as ensured the adequate preparation of the meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council and its coordination with other configurations.

It can be concluded that despite the post-Lisbon institutional changes (supporting presidency), the institutional structures and personnel of Hungarian diplomacy proved its creativity, flexibility and adaptability within the context of CFSP in its internal operation

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and also in the external representation of the Union on the global stage. Furthermore, playing its role in the EU Council Presidency, Hungary was able to provide a new impulse to the further deepening of EU relations with regions (such as the Western Balkans) of immediate importance for Hungary in the realm of EU foreign policy.

26.5 **TWO ASPECTS OF CFSP WITH DISCERNIBLE HUNGARIAN INTERESTS AND
ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT: EU ENLARGEMENT TOWARDS THE WESTERN
BALKANS AND CSDP MISSIONS**

26.5.1 *EU Enlargement as Hungarian Foreign Policy Purpose in the Western
Balkans*

Hungary has consistently represented the perception that the prospect of EU and/or NATO membership is the strongest incentive for political stabilization, economic and social reforms and cooperative security policies in the region south of Hungary. Therefore, it has been reiterated in various official Hungarian statements of its foreign policy and EU strategies since 2004 that it is the strategic interest of the country to support the states in the Western Balkans region in their efforts to join the EU and/or the transatlantic alliance. It implied the political and diplomatic endorsement of the membership aspirations of these countries by Hungary within EU and NATO institutional frameworks and decision-making platforms at all levels together with practical assistance for their preparations regarding the conditions of future membership.

The accession of Croatia to NATO in 2009 and its arrival at the gates of the EU by the very end of the Hungarian EU Presidency¹³ – the conclusion of accession negotiations on 30 June 2011 was viewed (at least in Hungary) as one the main achievements of Hungary during its term at the helm of the Council – clearly demonstrated the successful and exemplary transformation of another country (after Slovenia in 2004) from the Western Balkans into a full member of the two principal organizations of the Euro-Atlantic community of states. Hungarian foreign policy toward its immediate Balkans neighbourhood has been based on the conviction that the possibility of enlargement extending the perspective of membership for the region remains the only truly effective instrument of EU foreign and security policy towards south-eastern Europe. Consequently, decisive external influence over the political, social, and economic conditions in the remaining cluster of Western Balkans countries outside the Union can be efficiently exercised by the EU solely through

13 *Information on the Results of the EU Accession Negotiations with Croatia*, Compiled by the Directorate General for Enlargement European Commission, November 2011, p. 4 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/hp/results_of_th_eu_accession_negotiations_with_croatia.pdf.

the incentive of the ultimate reward of closer integration – with the perspective of eventual membership – in exchange for sustained institutional reform, legal approximation to EU standards and regional cooperation.

For the above reason, Hungary consistently sustained its political endorsement of the EU aspirations of Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia, while insisting that the requirements of ‘political harmonization’ (the Copenhagen criteria) need to be entirely satisfied.¹⁴ Among those political conditions of accession – reflecting a characteristically Hungarian priority and concern – the rights, status, and autonomy of national and ethnic minorities have to be fully respected and implemented.

In the practical dimension of support and assistance, Hungarian governments have offered to share the country’s experience in the areas of administrative and legal preparations and adaptation for EU membership, the use of EU funds, and institutional capacity-building. As an example of Hungarian assistance for institutional capacity-building in the region, the Hungarian National Assembly has been involved in strengthening the organizational and functional capacities of the parliaments of Croatia, Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo and also Bosnia and Herzegovina through a specific form of inter-institutional partnership (‘twinning programs’) between EU member states and aspirant or candidate countries financed by the European Union.

These offers were extended not only on a bilateral basis, but also jointly with other Visegrad Group countries (the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia, in addition to Hungary).¹⁵ The Visegrad Group with its demonstrable practice of pragmatic (sub)regional coordination without any permanent institutional structures has emerged as a potentially useful model for regional cooperation in the Western Balkans as well.

26.5.2 *Hungarian Participation in EU Crisis Management Operations and Missions*

Gradual development of ESDP/CSDP¹⁶ opened an additional dimension for direct and manifest involvement of Hungary in the operational implementation of CFSP in several crisis areas. Hungarian contribution to the implementation of crisis management operations and missions presented opportunities for the demonstration of the commitment of national

14 *Hungary’s Foreign Policy after the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the European Union*, 2011, p. 22, http://eu.kormany.hu/admin/download/f/1b/30000/foreign_policy_20111219.pdf.

15 *Visegrad Group Ministerial Statement on the Western Balkans*, Bratislava, 22 October 2010. *Joint Statement of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Visegrad Group on the Western Balkans*, Gödöllő 31, October 2013, *Visegrad Group Joint Statement on the Western Balkans*, Bratislava, 31 October 2014.

16 With the entry of the Lisbon Treaty into force, the defence and security policy dimension of CFSP – previously defined as European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – was renamed as Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

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capabilities and resources to the joint pursuit of Common Foreign and Security Policy purposes defined at EU level. Collective security undertakings on behalf of the Union created occasions for close coordination both in political and also in professional (military, police or civilian personnel) aspects of operation among EU members together with other countries participating as their external partners.

From 2004 onward a sequence of EU missions emerged which introduced a variety of geographical locations and functions offering more possibilities for selective involvement. In the operational aspect of CFSP, Hungary has regularly taken part in joint ESDP/CSDP undertakings, albeit cautiously and, in many cases, by limited means.¹⁷

Reflecting the direct importance of the south eastern and eastern perimeter of the European continent for its national foreign policy, Hungary has understandably been most active in relation to collective EU security undertakings in the Western Balkans (EUFOR Operation Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina¹⁸ and EULEX in Kosovo¹⁹) as well as in within the former Soviet imperial space (EUBAM in Moldova²⁰ and EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia²¹). The modalities of EU involvement in conflict resolution (or at least in its facilitation) and peace support enterprises in these regional theatres of former conflagrations presented obvious and reasonable occasions for the illustration of Hungarian engagement in the operational implementation of EU foreign policy objectives of post-conflict stabilisation and state (re)construction (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo) or the containment and resolution of unsettled conflicts (Transdnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia) in the neighbourhood of the European Union. The sustained presence of Hungarian civilian personnel or military contingents in those multinational security missions demonstrated not only the importance of those regions within the foreign policy of Hungary, but also the commitment of the country to collective efforts of stabilisation through either NATO or EU engagement.

The participation of Hungary in CSDP military and civilian missions is not limited to missions in the immediate neighbourhood of the Union. Nevertheless, the size of Hungarian contributions (in other words, the number of troops, police or civilian experts) indicate the clear and sensible priority of 'EU near abroad' in the national foreign policy choices of Hungary over regions and conflicts farther away.²² The more distant fields of EU engagements do not represent direct concerns for Hungary, but still appear on its foreign

17 'KBVP-műveletek szerte a világban' [CSDP Operations All over the World] Magyar Köztársaság, Külügyminisztériuma [Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs], www.kulugyminiszterium.hu/kum/hu/bal/Kulpolitikank/Biztonsagpolitika/kbvp/ebvp_muveletek.htm, 20 September 2010.

18 www.euforbih.org/.

19 www.eulex-kosovo.eu/.

20 www.eubam.org/.

21 www.eumm.eu/.

22 'Hol találhatóak magyar missziós alakulatok?' [Where the Hungarian troops are deployed in foreign missions?]. *Kormányportál*, www.kormany.hu/hu/mo/honvedelem.

policy agenda due to the broadened perspective of the country as an EU member participating in the system of regular coordination and consultation within CFSP. Even if not treated as a priority or necessity, Hungary did not abstain from extra-European CSDP missions for demonstrative purposes and also for reasons of gaining practice as well as information on the ground either in Africa, in the Middle East (EUPOL COPPs in Palestine²³) or in Afghanistan (EU Police Mission with 8 Hungarian police experts²⁴).

On the African continent, in Uganda small groups of Hungarian military experts played a role in training local forces within the framework of CSDP operation to assist in the training of new Somali army units (EU Training Mission Somalia).²⁵ Furthermore, the active support of Hungary appeared in the EU supporting expert and training operation launched in Mali (EU Training Mission MALI) in 2013.²⁶

These modest but concrete Hungarian contributions illustrate that in the course of CFSP actions Hungary seeks to support joint initiatives under EU banner not only by the adoption of political statements and diplomatic declarations, but also through the deployment of available means and capabilities in all cases when it has been deemed feasible and affordable to take part in EU civilian or military enterprises abroad. The benefits of participation come in the form of insights into the practice of EU-led multinational operations together with the opportunity to exert active influence on the outcome of common policy formation at the level of the Union. Direct involvement in EU missions and operations offers the chance for deeper knowledge of any given situation on the ground and more efficient representation of Hungarian objectives in the adoption of policy responses at the level of the Union.

As the instances of Hungarian contributions to CSDP undertakings have demonstrated, Hungary intends to sustain an active role in EU crisis management engagements and continue her support for the development of EU institutions and practice in that regard.²⁷

23 <http://eupolcoppes.eu/en/content/rule-law-section>.

24 *Átalakuló magyar szerepvállalás Afganisztánban* [The changing nature of Hungarian role in Afghanistan], Hungarian government information leaflet, 2012, <http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/download/9/07/a0000/Magyarorsz%C3%A1g%20afganiszt%C3%A1ni%20szerepv%C3%A1llal%C3%A1sa%20HU.pdf>.

25 http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-somalia/docs/factsheet_eutm_somalia_en.pdf.

26 http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-mali/index_en.htm.

27 *Hungary's Foreign Policy after the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the European Union*, Budapest, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, 2011. p. 33.

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26.6 **THE FIRST FOUR YEARS OF THE POST-LISBON SYSTEM IN EU FOREIGN
POLICY: A HALF FULL GLASS?**

In an earlier report to the European Council, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy perfectly described the global environment of the European foreign policy:

Europe's strategic environment today is marked by increased regional and global volatility, emerging security challenges, the US rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific and the impact of the financial crisis. The world as a whole faces increased volatility, complexity and uncertainty. A multipolar and interconnected international system is changing the nature of power. The distinction between internal and external security is breaking down. Complex layers of governance and new patterns of interdependence empower new players and give rise to new challenges. As a result, state power is becoming more fragile. Among the drivers for this are: changing demographics and population growth, embedded inequalities, and new technologies.²⁸

The question should be asked: to what extent the new institutional set-up and the renewed role of the High Representative met the expectations arising from the new strategic environment?

First, the High Representative was chiefly responsible for the establishment and the management of a new distinct structure (EEAS) in the institutional system of the Union facing strong institutional resistance. In other words, the new institutional framework of the EU's foreign policy appeared in the symbolic map of European political power.

At the beginning, the press accounts of the High Representative of the EU were disastrous.²⁹ Later, however, the perceptions of the role and performance of the EUHR changed as the result of the conduct of negotiations in two complex and difficult political and diplomatic challenges such as the Iran nuclear programme or the Belgrad-Pristina dialogue. Both issues figured prominently on the CFSP agenda as matters of strategic relevance for the shared foreign policy and security interests of EU members in their immediate neighbourhood (in the Western-Balkans) and in the field of nuclear proliferation coupled with regional destabilization (in the Middle East). With respect to these high priority issues, the EU was able to exert decisive influence and play a central role in the process of diplo-

28 *Preparing the December 2013 European Council on Security and Defence – Final Report by the High Representative/Head of the EDA on the Common Security and Defence Policy*, Brussels, 15 October 2013.

29 Just one typical example to be mentioned: Andrew Pierce: Who earns more, Hillary Clinton or Baroness Nobody? Cathy Ashton... even though she's the laughing stock of the EU, *The Mail On Sunday*, 9 March 2010, www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1255840/How-Cathy-Ashton-laughing-stock-EU.html.

matic settlement of either a local conflict or a global confrontation through the initiatives and involvement of the EU High Representative.

26.6.1 *Serbia and Kosovo*

An EU-facilitated dialogue trying to maintain the momentum of negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo – previously held under UN auspices – was launched in March 2011. The negotiations were initially conducted in a trilateral format without the participation of the highest political level with the participation of the Deputy Prime Minister from Kosovo, the political director at the Serbian Foreign Ministry and chief advisor of the European External Action Service as the ‘EU facilitator.’³⁰ These diplomatic talks placed practical issues on the agenda (commercial and customs matters, the free movement of persons, mutual recognition of diplomas, etc.), deliberately avoiding the divisive issue of the status of Kosovo. Of course, the European integration aspirations of the two countries served as the underlying motivation for the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. The credibility of the European perspective and the rewards for results contributed to its success (eg. status of EU candidate country of Serbia in March 2012). The dialogue took a new turn when in October 2012 the negotiations continued at prime ministerial level mediated by the EU High Representative.

In accordance with the decision of the General Affairs Council in December 2012 it was necessary to continue the dialogue for a visible and lasting settlement between Kosovo and Serbia.³¹ The expected settlement was determined as the condition for further steps in the integration process for the two countries. The main result of the negotiations between the Prime Ministers of Serbian and Kosovo Prime Ministers mediated by the EU High Representative was achieved in April 2013, at the tenth round of the dialogue.³² The two Prime Ministers signed a 15-point agreement on Northern Kosovo and the Serbs in Kosovo which was confirmed by both governments later. In accordance with the principles laid down in the agreement, Kosovo would practice a high-level of self-governance. The association of Serbian municipalities would however be part of the single, united administration of the Republic of Kosovo. This meant that the Serbian parallel institutional system in Northern Kosovo would no longer exist.

30 *EU facilitated dialogue: A positive start in Brussels*, Press statement, Brussels, 8-9 March 2011, Doc. 7566/11, www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/foraff/119690.pdf.

31 Council conclusions on Enlargement and Stabilization and Association, 3210th General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 11 December 2012. www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/134234.pdf.

32 *Remarks by High Representative Catherine Ashton on the EU-facilitated dialogue*, Brussels, 19 April 2013, A 216/13 www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/136875.pdf.

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Following the agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, the joint report of the European Commission and the EU High Representative stated that appropriate measures were taken by Serbia for the visible and lasting improvement of relations with Kosovo.³³ On the basis of this conclusion, the Commission suggested that the EU should start accession negotiations with Serbia and, at the same time, launch Stabilisation and Association Agreement negotiations with Kosovo.

In May 2013, at the next round of the dialogue, the implementation plan of the agreement was adopted. Under the agreement, both the Kosovo and the Serbian liaison officers started their works respectively in Belgrade and Pristina. Before the of the European Council approved the launch of the EU accession negotiations with Serbia,³⁴ the parties to the EU-facilitated dialogue had to agree on the continuation of their engagements in the resolution of several further issues (ranging from municipal elections in Northern Kosovo and the Police Commissioner of the regional police force of the Northern Kosovo local governments with a Serbian majority to telecommunication, energy, administration of justice/amnesty between the two countries aspiring to closer integration with the European Union).

In October 2013, the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) negotiations between the EU and Kosovo were opened and the EU accession negotiations of Serbia were launched in January 2014. As the EU Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, Johannes Hahn predicted, the SAA with Kosovo was signed during 2015.³⁵ While the new High Representative, Frederica Mogherini, promised in Belgrad in March 2015 that the EU would open negotiating chapters with Serbia later in 2015.³⁶

All this would not have been possible without the active mediation and the personal commitment of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy supported by the institutional background ensured by the European External Action Service.

26.6.2 *Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran*

Negotiations between the international community and Iran have been going on since 2003 with the participation of the three largest EU Member States (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) as the EU3 launched a joint diplomatic effort in June 2003 to resolve

33 *Joint report to the European Parliament and the Council on Serbia's progress in achieving the necessary degree of compliance with the membership criteria and notably the key priority of taking steps towards a visible and sustainable improvement of relations with Kosovo*, Brussels, 22.4.2013, JOIN(2013) 7 final, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/sr_spring_report_2013_en.pdf.

34 European Council conclusions, Brussels, 27-28 June 2013.

35 Una Hajdari: Kosovo Will Sign SAA This Year, Hahn Says, *Balkan Insight*, 18 February 2015, www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-to-sign-saa-within-the-year-says-eu.

36 EU wants Serbia accession talks to begin in earnest this year, *Reuters.com*, 27 March 2015, www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/27/us-serbia-eu-accession-idUSKBN0MN1V620150327.

the outstanding issues with regard to the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. In 2004, the first EU High Representative, Javier Solana joined the multilateral talks on behalf of the European Union to ensure the engagement of the EU as a whole in the process. When the United States, Russia and China decided to enter into the negotiations, the international cluster became P5 (UN Security Council five permanent members) + 1 (Germany as one of the initial state parties and the key European trading partner of Iran) + the EU in its institutional capacity through the participation of its High Representative for CFSP. By mutual agreement of all participating states, the High Representative acted and spoke on behalf of the entire group identified as E3/EU+3 in the course of negotiations with Iran on its nuclear programme.³⁷

Practically just before the arrival of the new High Representative the talks took off in 2009 after years of standstill. The result of four years of complicated and prolonged negotiations, a landmark agreement (Joint Plan of Action)³⁸ was reached between Iran and the E3/EU+3 in November 2013 signalling an opportunity for historic turning point and also a prominent personal success for the EU High Representative. In recognition of the significance of the achieved breakthrough, the FAC in January 2014 decided to significantly ease the EU sanctions applied to Iran. Later the negotiations continued on the basis of the adopted roadmap and even beyond the agreed deadline. (After leaving her post, the new High Representative, requested her predecessor to stay on board as an important member of the E3/EU+3 negotiating team.)

26.7 CONCLUDING REMARK

To the question whether the work of the first EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and that of the EEAS between the end of 2010 and the autumn of 2014 may be considered successful, we can give a partially affirmative answer. It is a typical case for a glass half full. On the one hand, after many inter-institutional controversies and rivalries, the formation and consolidation of the European External Action Service was accomplished as an obvious feat largely attributable to the High Representative. In addition to the establishment of the EEAS, the activity of the High Representative and of the Service may be regarded as particularly successful in the above summarized chapters (Serbia-Kosovo and Iran) of CFSP agenda. On the other hand, it is also true that in recent times there have been difficulties several times in coordinating between the Member States and the EEAS. In several key areas, (for instance: in the Southern and in the Eastern

37 In illustration: *Summary of remarks by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, at the press conference in Tehran*, S211/08, Tehran, 14 June 2008.

38 http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131124_03_en.pdf. We leave aside the content analysis of the agreement here.

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Neighbourhood of the European Union) much fewer results can be recognized. Therefore we can rather talk about a glass half full. In terms of the big picture and history of the European integration, it could be argued that a substantial progress was made by the High Representative and the EEAS during their first five years of operation under the new post-Lisbon arrangement.³⁹

39 After the breakthrough achieved in the dossiers Serbia-Kosovo and Iran also the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs having been critical almost all the time was forced to admit Catherine Ashton's successes. See EU foreign policy chief, Lady Ashton comes of age in Iran talks, *Financial Times*, 26 November 2013. In addition, also the programme of the new German great coalition government insists that the EEAS must be strengthened and developed further: <https://www.cdu.de/sites/default/files/media/dokumente/koalitionsvertrag.pdf>.